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I. INTRODUCTION
   The theory of enterprise liability is associated with the tort lawmaking
of the liberal California Supreme Court of the 1960s and 1970s.1  Legal
pragmatism, in turn, is associated with the conservative jurist Richard
Posner.2  This Article explains that early incarnations of each can be
found in the works of four giants in American law: Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Judge—later Justice—Benjamin Cardozo, and the 
Legal Realists Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn.  As will be seen, these 
scholars and judges shared a common view of the lawmaking role of 
courts.  Stated simply, this shared view was that judges are lawmakers
and policy does—and should—shape their lawmaking.  If this formulation
sounds familiar, it is because of its similarity to Judge Richard Posner’s
legal pragmatism, which Posner himself has linked to Holmes and
Cardozo.  Posner’s legal pragmatist believes that at times “judges in our 
1. See  VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE 
LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 116–22 (1995); 
Edmund Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and
Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1267, 1291, 1296–97 (2009). 
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 118, 238 (2008); see also 
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDIS & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES (2013) (presenting and testing empirically a theory of behavior of federal 
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system are legislators as well as adjudicators” and that policy judgments
are at the core of their lawmaking.3 
A particular focus of this Article will be judicial lawmaking in the 
common law and, more specifically, tort law.  This focus reveals that we
can see in the works of these great judges and scholars the origins of the
enterprise liability doctrines adopted by courts in recent decades, in
particular, the doctrine of strict products liability and the policy-based 
expansion of liability within the negligence system.
We begin, in Part II, following this introduction, with a brief
examination of the crisis in workplace accidents at the turn of the
twentieth century, as widows, orphans, and injured workers vainly sought 
compensation through a—pre-workers’ compensation—tort system.4  That 
tort system was a product of mid-nineteenth century judges who had felt 
free to craft tort doctrines to meet the felt necessities of their time.  For 
example, decisions by judges, such as Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of
Massachusetts, had established the negligence requirement, as well as the
fellow servant rule and the doctrines of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk.  Taken together, these stalwarts of what might be 
called traditional tort theory often left injured workers and their families 
with no legal remedy against employers and thus without any practical 
hope of compensation. 
One might have thought that later judges would adapt tort common
law to the felt necessities of their time, just as judges like Lemuel Shaw 
had done for theirs.  By the late nineteenth century, however, judges no
longer saw this as their role.  These formalist judges maintained that
courts do not and should not “make law.”   
   In reality, however, these formalist judges were active lawmakers.
Around the turn of the twentieth century and for the next four decades, 
during what is known as the Lochner era, after the Supreme Court’s
1905 decision in Lochner v. New York,5 the courts of this country, 
including the United States Supreme Court, invoked the United States 
3. POSNER, supra note 2, at 13, 118, 238. For a recent statement of eight 
principles of legal pragmatism, see Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial 
Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 540–42 (2012). 
4. See CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 121–23 (1910).  See 
generally  JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, 
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004) (providing a legal 
history of employee accident law and the adoption of workers’ compensation 
legislation). 






















         
    
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
Constitution, and especially the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, “to strike down laws fixing minimum wages and maximum 
hours in employment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business 
activities.”6
   For some, the lesson of Lochner was that courts should refrain from
the sort of policy-based lawmaking that I have attributed to our great
judges and scholars.7  Indeed, in his famous Lochner dissent, Holmes
wrote, “This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain.”8  And he felt compelled to remind the
Court that “a constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”9  One might interpret this as a 
warning against policy-based judicial lawmaking. 
However, that would be to misread Holmes.  Thus, after our brief look 
at the state of the American legal system at the turn of the twentieth
century, we turn in Part III to Holmes’s famous 1897 essay, The Path of 
the Law.10  There we find that far from being critical of policy-based
lawmaking by courts, Holmes chastised courts of that era for their lack 
of just such lawmaking.  Focusing on the law of worker accidents, Holmes
first noted the “inclination of a very large part of the community . . . to
make certain [well-known businesses] insure the safety of those with
whom they deal.”11  Then turning to the lawmaking role of the courts— 
and setting aside how he would decide the substantive issue if it were 
presented to him—Holmes suggested that courts might properly rewrite 
the pre-workers’ compensation tort law governing workplace accidents.12 
For Holmes, there was nothing anomalous in recognizing the role of 
policy in the common law, where the legislature can always unwrite the
law the courts have written, while calling for judicial self-restraint when
the legislature has spoken.  In fact, anticipating decisions like Lochner, 
Holmes made precisely this point in The Path of the Law, writing that 
courts cognizant of the policies at stake should hesitate in constitutional 
adjudication to overturn legislation.13 
6. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 
(1949). 
7. See, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 
HARV. L. REV. 372, 372–73 (1939); 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20–21 (1939); 48 YALE L.J. 
390, 390–91 (1939) [hereinafter citing to HARV. L. REV.]. 
8. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
9. Id. 
10. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
11. Id. at 466. 
12. Id. at 466–67.  I first discussed this in Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and 
Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 271–75 (1981). 
13. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 467–68. 
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Although courts did not rewrite the law of employee accidents,
legislatures did.  As discussed in Part IV, New York responded to the 
workplace accident crisis in 1910 by enacting the nation’s first workers’
compensation legislation.14 That legislation, which dispensed with the
fault requirement, was a landmark event in personal injury law—and, as 
we will see, the inspiration for the enterprise liability doctrines that
Green and Llewellyn would urge courts to adopt twenty years later.  But
this is to jump ahead. 
The immediate response of the New York Court of Appeals was far 
different.  In 1911, the year following the enactment of the legislation,
the New York Court of Appeals held in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway 
Co. that the legislation violated the due process clauses of both the New
York and United States Constitutions by dispensing with the fault
requirement.15 The Ives decision unleashed public wrath and “a storm of
disapproval,” causing, along with the Supreme Court’s Lochner decision,
“the greatest court controversy since Dred Scott.”16  The voters of New 
York quickly responded to Ives by enacting, in 1913, a constitutional
amendment authorizing the state legislature to enact workers’ compensation 
legislation, which the legislature promptly did.17  The New York Court 
of Appeals, in turn, did a turnabout in 1915 by upholding the new 
legislation in Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., overruling Ives by finding
that the new legislation did not violate the Federal Constitution.18
   Benjamin Cardozo was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals 
in 1913, two years after the Ives decision, and thus sat on that court as it
changed course in Jensen.19  Then, in 1916, as discussed in Part V, 
Cardozo issued his decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., marking 
a second landmark event in twentieth-century personal injury law, made
all the more remarkable by the five tumultuous years that preceded it.20 
MacPherson paved the way for the elimination of the privity requirement
14. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 68 (1967). 
15. See 94 N.E. 431, 439–40 (N.Y. 1911). 
16. WITT, supra note 4, at 152. 
17. Id. at 176 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18). 
18. 109 N.E. 600, 602, 604 (N.Y. 1915). 
19. See  RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 2–3 (1990)
(“After only a month on the state supreme court, he was breveted to the New York Court 
of Appeals . . . .”).  He was elected to that position in 1917.  Id. at 3. 




    
  





   
   
 
 




    
 
  
   
 
  




   
 
 
    
in negligence suits involving injury from defective products21—and,
Justice Traynor would later argue, could provide a bridge to the doctrine 
of strict products liability.22 
Following the discussion of these seminal events, the Article turns in
Part VI to Cardozo’s major jurisprudential work, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process, which was published in 1921 after being given as a 
series of lectures at Yale Law School.23  Judge Posner has written that
Cardozo presented “the classic full-blown exposition of the pragmatic 
position sketched by Holmes,” and he is correct.24 The Nature of the
Judicial Process is an eloquent and nuanced treatment of legal pragmatism.
Holmes notwithstanding, however, the dominant view at the time
Cardozo wrote was that courts do not make law and that policy plays no
role in their decisionmaking.25  Echoing themes developed by Holmes, 
Cardozo rejected this view, writing that “the function of our courts [is]
. . . to keep the doctrines up to date with the mores by continual 
restatement and by giving them a continually new content.”26  Common 
law judges must innovate, “for with new conditions there must be new 
rules.”27 “This means . . . that the juristic philosophy of the common law is
at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism.”28  Like Holmes, Cardozo also 
took Lochner-era courts to task for their lack of deference to the 
21. At the time MacPherson was decided, a person injured by a negligently 
manufactured product had no tort action against the manufacturer if, as was most often
the case, the product had been purchased from a dealer, as opposed to the manufacturer.
See Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a 
Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 3 (2005).  An exception to this privity
requirement had been established, however, for products that were imminently
dangerous to life or health.  Id.  In  MacPherson, the imminently dangerous exception
was so expansively interpreted that by the end of the opinion it was on its way to
becoming the rule for all products.  See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; see, e.g., Brian 
Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 
865, 880 (2012). 
22. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). 
23. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); see 
also Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 
195 (1961) (noting that Justice Cardozo authored “four lectures entitled The Nature of 
the Judicial Process that were delivered at Yale”).
24. POSNER, supra note 19, at 21.  Judge Posner also notes, however, that “with
the aid of hindsight almost everything in The Nature of the Judicial Process can be 
found in embryo form somewhere in Holmes’s voluminous writings.” Id. 
25. See Seavey, supra note 7, at 372–73. 
26. CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 135 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Offer of an 
Act for a Promise, 29 YALE L.J. 767, 771 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27. Id. at 137. 
28. Id. at 102 (citing Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 
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legislative process, writing that it was Holmes’s dissent to “which men
will turn to in the future as the beginning of an era.”29 
Although the enactment of workers’ compensation legislation and 
Cardozo’s own MacPherson decision were the two most important 
developments in the personal injury law of the first half of the twentieth 
century, Cardozo, curiously, did not comment extensively on either—or 
on his court’s Ives and Jensen decisions.  Nor did he speculate about the 
implications of these developments for the future of personal injury law. 
These matters, however, would shape the thinking of two seminal Legal
Realists of the next generation: Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn, to 
whose work we turn in Part VII. 
   Green and Llewellyn followed the lead of Holmes and Cardozo in their 
opposition to Lochner-era constitutional decisions.  But this was not
their focus, nor really was the process of judicial lawmaking—aside
from Llewellyn’s well-known writings on Legal Realism.30  Green’s
focus was tort law, and Llewellyn’s was contract and sales law.  When 
Green and Llewellyn wrote about their respective subjects, each recognized, 
contrary to the still dominant legal formalism of their time, the reality, 
inevitability, and desirability of judicial lawmaking.  In addition, each
recognized the central role that policy plays in that process.  Green’s and 
Llewellyn’s substantive writings revealed a jurisprudential view that was 
29. Id. at 79. 
30. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 431 (1930).  Llewellyn’s article and other Legal Realists’ works 
drew a rebuke from Roscoe Pound for their perceived radicalism.  See Roscoe Pound,
The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697–99 (1931).  Llewellyn
swiftly responded.  See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to 
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223–25 (1931).  In 1932, on the eve of his 
appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Cardozo gave an address to a meeting
of the New York State Bar Association in which he sought—unsuccessfully—to mediate 
between the two sides and to “moderate what he saw as the nihilist tendencies of some
realists, especially their exaggeration of the indeterminacy of legal principles.”  ANDREW
L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 456 (1998) (discussing Benjamin N. Cardozo, Jurisprudence, in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 7–46 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 
1947)); see also  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS app. B at 508–12 (1960) (discussing interpretations of American Legal 
Realism).  Llewellyn’s book was criticized by Judge Charles E. Clark and David Trubek
on the ground that it “recognizes judicial creativity as part of the common law tradition, 
but seems . . . to reject the notion of judicial freedom which was the starting point for 
Cardozo’s fourth method of decision—the method of social value, or the judge as a 
legislator.”  Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge:


















    
 
   
 
 
    
 
simple and clear: in the common law realm, courts (1) do make law, and
(2) such lawmaking is so obviously desirable, necessary, and in our
common law tradition that it needed no fancy jurisprudential justification—
beyond, that is, arguments as to the substantive desirability of particular 
proposals. 
   Green and Llewellyn believed, as Brian Leiter has written about Legal 
Realists generally, that legal decisions fall into patterns determined more 
by “situation types” than by formal legal rules.31  But contrary to Leiter, 
Green and Llewellyn also put forth a robust normative agenda—and, in
doing so, laid the foundations for the enterprise liability doctrines that
courts would adopt decades later.32 
In Green’s view, “[t]he idea of ‘fault,’” the cornerstone of traditional 
tort theory, had become bankrupt.33  In its place Green offered policy, or 
“dut[y],” factors to determine common law duty and liability rules—and 
whether compensation plans modeled after workers’ compensation plans
should displace tort in discrete categories of accidents.34  Perhaps most 
provocative was Green’s suggestion that loss spreading capacity should
be a legitimate factor in fashioning liability rules, which he linked to the 
proposal that courts single out industrial premises cases for special 
consideration, including the possibility of replacing the no-duty rules
that protected landowners from liability with a full duty of care.35 
For his part, Llewellyn saw the law of sales, and in particular the
implied warranty of quality that attaches to the sale of goods, as a source 
for courts to use in developing a doctrine of strict products liability.36 
The “needed protection,” Llewellyn wrote, “is twofold: to shift the 
immediate incidence of the hazard of life in an industrial society away
from the individual over to a group which can distribute the loss; and to 
place the loss where the most pressure will be exerted to keep down 
future losses.”37 
31. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1148 
(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM 
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). 
32. See, e.g., Ursin, Clarifying, supra note * at 488; Ursin, Missing Dimension, 
supra note * at 4. 
33. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 
255, 270 (1929). 
34. Id. at 255–57. 
35. Id. at 273–75. 
36. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 341– 
42 (1930); K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 
699, 704 n.14 (1936). 
37. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 341. 
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Judges acting in the manner suggested by Green and Llewellyn would 
be engaged in what a contemporary of theirs termed “juristic pragmatism.”38 
To use Judge Posner’s terminology, they were legal pragmatists who 
believed that judges are “legislators as well as adjudicators” with policy
at the core of their lawmaking.39  As discussed in Part VIII, the concluding
section of this Article, this is the role the California Supreme Court—the 
nation’s leading state supreme court40—has assumed since the 1960s, as 
it has written the methodology and doctrines suggested by Green and
Llewellyn into law.41 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: TORT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT THE 
TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States had become an
industrial nation.  To take one example, the railroad industry had come
into its own by that date.  Mileage figures indicate its success.  In 1840, 
total track mileage in America was less than 3000 miles.  The subsequent 
success of the railroad was spectacular.  “Railway mileage climbed from 
about 35,000 in 1865 to 74,000 in 1875, to 128,000 in 1885, to about
190,000 by 1900—a 600 per cent growth in 35 years.”42  Similarly, 
business enterprises that had once been small and struggling had become 
large corporations.  “By 1904 manufacturing companies producing over
$1 million of value added in manufacturing were less than one per cent 
of all such concerns, but accounted for about 30 per cent of the total 
value added by manufacturing.”43  Moreover, corporate consolidation was
rampant.  “From 1890 to 1904 some 237 corporate consolidations occurred,
each involving business of regional or national extent, each capitalized
for more than $1 million, representing almost every important field of 
manufacture.”44 
38. See Fowler Vincent Harper, Some Implications of Juristic Pragmatism, 39 
INT’L J. ETHICS 269, 290 (1929). 
39. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 13, 118, 238. 
40. See Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen,  “Followed Rates” and Leading State 
Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 710 (2007). 
41. See Ursin, supra note 1, at 1335–38; Ursin, Missing Dimension, supra note * 
at 32–35. 
42. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 72 (1956). 
43. Id. at 71–72. 
44. Id. at 72; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN 
TO F.D.R. 230 (1955) (“[T]he interlocking directorates of American corporations 
545

















    
     







      
As industry grew, however, so did the number of injuries associated
with it.  John Fabian Witt has written that at the turn of the twentieth 
century, the United States “was in the fifth decade of an accident crisis
like none the world had ever seen and like none any Western nation has 
witnessed since.”45  Between 1889 and 1906, for example, the railway 
injury rate doubled.46  At the turn of the century, industrial accidents 
accounted for 35,000 deaths and 2,000,000 injuries each year.47  “One  
quarter of [these] injuries produced disabilities lasting more than one
week.”48  “[O]ne worker in fifty was killed or disabled for at least four 
weeks each year because of a work-related accident.  Among the population 
as a whole, roughly one in every thousand Americans died in an accident 
each year.”49  The historian Richard Hofstadter reminds us that “[t]oday
it is perhaps necessary to make a strong effort of the imagination to
recall the industrial barbarism that was being tamed [during that era] . . . 
when every year some 16,000 or 17,000 trainmen (about one out of every
ten or twelve workers so classified) were injured.”50
   The social problem presented by industrial accidents was due in large 
part to the lawmaking of judges of the mid-nineteenth century who had 
felt free to craft tort doctrines to meet the felt necessities of their time. 
Decisions by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts, for example,
had established the negligence requirement, the fellow servant rule, and 
the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.51  Taken
together, these stalwarts of traditional tort theory often left injured workers 
with no legal remedy against their employer and thus without any practical 
hope of compensation. 
[showed] that fewer than one hundred men, acting in concert, controlled the great 
business interests of the country.”); Max Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire, in PATHS 
OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 147, 147–49 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Morton White eds., 
1963) (“The spreading power of corporations [in the late nineteenth century] produced a 
new corporate elite, with a talent for combining formerly independent operations . . . .). 
See generally ARTHUR CECIL BINING & THOMAS C. COCHRAN, THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC LIFE (4th ed. 1964); ARTHUR F. BURNS, PRODUCTION TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES SINCE 1870 (1934); ALEX GRONER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN BUSINESS & INDUSTRY (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1972). 
45. WITT, supra note 4, at 2. 
46. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 14, at 60. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (citing E.H. DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA 1– 
2 (1912)). 
49. WITT, supra note 4, at 2–3 (citing Frederick Hoffman, Industrial Accident 
Statistics, BULL. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., Mar. 1915, at 5–6, 13). 
50. HOFSTADTER, supra note 44, at 240. 
51. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 297–98 (1850) (establishing 
negligence standard and contributory negligence doctrine); Farwell v. Bos. & Worcester 
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A study conducted by Crystal Eastman for the Russell Sage Foundation
and published in 1910 illustrates the situation with a detailed examination of
Pittsburgh and Allegheny County.52  In instances of work-related accident 
fatalities, widows and children were given little or no assistance by the 
legal system.  In the majority of cases, widows and children bore the entire 
income loss.53  In fewer than one third of the cases did an employer pay as
much as five hundred dollars.54  A similar situation prevailed when an
employee was injured but not killed. More than half of these workers 
received no compensation, and only five percent were fully compensated 
for their lost working time while disabled.  The study concluded that the 
result was “[n]ot hardship alone, but hardship [as] an outcome of injustice.”55 
Indeed, the problem was so great that President Theodore Roosevelt 
made it the focal point of a major 1907 speech.  In that speech, Roosevelt 
told his audience that “[t]he great increase in mechanical and manufacturing 
operations . . . means a corresponding increase in the number of accidents to
the wage-workers employed therein.”56  “[I]t is a bitter injustice,” Roosevelt
continued, “that it should be the wage-worker himself and his wife and 
children who bear the whole penalty.”57
   One might have thought that courts would ameliorate this “bitter 
injustice” by adapting the common law of torts to the felt necessities of
their time just as judges like Lemuel Shaw had done for theirs.  By the 
late nineteenth century, however, judges no longer saw this as their role. 
These judges maintained that courts do not and should not “make law.” 
Most judges “saw their task . . . as the preservation of the logical structure 
of the rules and fundamental principles of the law.”58  As Holmes
52. EASTMAN, supra note 4, at 6.  Similar studies were made of conditions in 
other geographic areas.  See, e.g., Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 435 (N.Y. 
1911).  See generally Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 14 (exploring the “concept of 
social change and illustrating its relationship to change in the law”). 
53. EASTMAN, supra note 4, at 121–22. 
54. Id. at 121–23. 
55. Id. at 152, quoted in JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 44 (1976). 
56. WITT, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, Roosevelt
Pays Glowing Tribute to South and Its Marvelous Progress.  Automatic Indemnity for
Personal Injury, WASH. POST, June 11, 1907, at 11) [hereinafter Proud of His Georgian 
Ancestry] (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 3 (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, supra note 56, at 11) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
58. William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of 
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 515 (1974). 
One scholar has suggested that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century doctrinal 
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himself wrote, these formalist judges did “not like to discuss questions 
of policy.”59  Rather, they treated the judicial process as one of “logical 
deduction” and sought to make “legal reasoning seem like mathematics.”60 
In reality, however, formalist judges were very active lawmakers. 
During the period around the turn of the century and for almost four
decades into the twentieth century, the courts of this country, including 
the United States Supreme Court, invoked the United States Constitution, 
and especially the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
“to strike down laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours in 
employment, laws fixing prices and laws regulating business activities.”61 
This era has been called the Lochner era, named for the United States 
Supreme Court’s 1905 decision that signaled the Court’s explicit adoption 
of a policy of judicial intervention.62 
Decisions of this era drew heated criticism.  Foremost among the 
critics was Holmes.  In his classic Lochner dissent, Holmes wrote, “This
case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country 
does not entertain.”63  And he felt compelled to remind the Court that the
“Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statistics.”64  Holmes wrote that “a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”65  Holmes concluded that 
change in tort law was influenced by intellectual pressure to articulate “scientific” 
principles, as well as by more widely recognized economic factors.  See G. EDWARD 
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20–62 (expanded ed. 2003); 
G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 213, 213–14 (1978). 
59. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
7 (1894). 
60. Id. 
61. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 
(1949); see, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1929) (holding 
statute fixing price for gasoline sales in state unconstitutional); Tyson & Brother United 
Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 444–45 (1927) (holding statute 
fixing maximum resale price for theater tickets contravened Fourteenth Amendment); 
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923) (holding statute fixing
minimum wages for women and children unconstitutional); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 412–13, 416 (1922) (holding unconstitutional statute forbidding coal mining
that in any way causes subsidence of human habitations). 
62. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52, 64–65 (1905) (holding New York 
state law limiting work hours in bakeries to sixty per week or ten per day unconstitutional 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to 
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a 
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions 
of our people and our law.66
   Critics of the Lochner Court constantly drew upon Holmes’s position. 
A prominent and early example is Roscoe Pound, who later served as 
dean of Harvard Law School for two decades.  Writing in 1908, Pound 
denounced judges who purported to deduce results in cases from preexisting 
principles, a technique Pound called “mechanical jurisprudence.”67  This
mechanical jurisprudence was fatally flawed precisely because it ignored 
the social reality to which legal rules must be applied.  The decision in 
Lochner exemplified this judicial technique.  In its place, Pound called
for a “Sociological Jurisprudence,”68 which he defined as “the movement 
for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human conditions 
they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles.”69 Not 
surprisingly, Pound saw Holmes’s Lochner dissent not only as a source
of his ideas but also as the best exposition of sociological jurisprudence 
in America.70 
66. Id. at 76. 
67. Pound, supra note 28, at 605.  Pound was a prolific writer whose work 
spanned half a century.  For examples of his work bearing on the themes discussed in 
this Article, see generally Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. 
L. REV. 697 (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (pts. 1–3), 36
HARV. L. REV. 641, 802, 940 (1923) [hereinafter Judicial Decision]; Roscoe Pound, The 
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 
(1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19
GREEN BAG 607 (1907) [hereinafter Sociological Jurisprudence]; Roscoe Pound, Do We 
Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339 (1905).  For a biography of Pound, 
see DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974).  See generally 
G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972) (discussing
movement from mechanical justice to sociological jurisprudence). 
68. See Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence, supra note 67. 
69. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909). 

















   








III. HOLMES AND THE PATH OF THE LAW 
A.  Holmes and the Need for Judicial Creativity in            
Common Law Subjects 
   Holmes’s Lochner dissent is often seen as the starting point for 
discussions of the proper lawmaking role of courts.  But before the 
Lochner dissent, there was Holmes’s prescient 1897 essay, The Path of 
the Law.71  In that essay, Holmes not only foresaw the coming of Lochner- 
like decisions but also suggested the path that twentieth-century accident 
law might take.72  In doing so, he laid out his view of the lawmaking role
of courts both in common law subjects and in constitutional decisions.73 
Even as traditional tort theory flourished and courts began to embrace 
the formalism—and substance—of what was to become the Lochner era,
an alternative view emerged, and its spokesperson was Holmes himself.
Perhaps obscured by the prominence of his Lochner dissent is that
Holmes’s view of judicial lawmaking can be seen as an articulation and 
extension of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s conception of the lawmaking 
role of courts.74  In The Common Law, Holmes wrote of Shaw that “the 
strength of that great judge lay in an accurate appreciation of the
requirements of the community whose officer he was.”75  Although
Holmes conceded that “[s]ome, indeed many, English judges could be 
named who have surpassed him in accurate technical knowledge,” he
argued that “few have lived who were his equals in their understanding
of the grounds of public policy to which all laws must ultimately be
referred.”76  He concluded that “[i]t was this which made [Shaw], in the 
language of the late Judge Curtis, the greatest magistrate which this 
country has produced.”77
   Shaw’s mid-nineteenth century jurisprudential perspective is reflected
in The Common Law as well as in Holmes’s later work.  Indeed, Holmes 
chose to open The Common Law with an attack on those who, like
Christopher Columbus Langdell, the founder of the modern case method, 
disagreed with Shaw’s conception of the judicial role.78  Contrary to 
71. Holmes, supra note 10. 
72. Id. at 467. 
73. See id. 
74. The historian Daniel Boorstin has called Holmes “the Shaw of the early 20th 
century.”  DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 42 (1965). 




78. Id. at 1, 3–4.  The opening paragraphs of The Common Law, as well as the 
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Langdell—and of course, the formalists of the subsequent Lochner era— 
Holmes argued that the common law could not be reduced to apolitical, 
logical postulates.  Rather, the common law was the product of “[t]he
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men.”79  In shaping the common 
law, therefore, courts had reflected and should reflect “what is expedient 
for the community concerned.”80 
Although Holmes’s concept of the judicial role resembled Shaw’s, 
Holmes applied this concept in a different era.  During the Lochner era,
the judiciary was content with the status quo at a time when courts might
have fashioned new responses to the problem of injuries caused by
industrialization.  In 1897, Holmes addressed the problem of industrial
accidents in his classic essay, The Path of the Law.81  He first argued, as
he had in The Common Law, that behind its form and logic, the common
law reflects judicial accommodation of “competing legislative grounds.”82 
Accordingly, “the means do not exist for determinations that shall be 
good for all time, and . . . the decision can do no more than embody the
preference of a given body in a given time and place.”83  Thus, as social 
conditions and values change, the judge must reconsider the common
law.  Indeed, Holmes argued that “[w]e do not realize how large a part of
our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of 
the public mind.”84
   Turning specifically to the common law of worker injuries, Holmes 
developed themes that presage the enterprise liability theories of the 
Legal Realists three decades later.  Holmes noted that judges instruct
juries “that an employer is not liable to an employee for an injury received
Langdell’s contracts casebook.  See Book Notice, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 233–35 (1880)
(reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A 
SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879)).
79. HOLMES, supra note 75, at 1. 
80. Id. at 24. 
81. Holmes, supra note 10, at 467. The Path of the Law is an acknowledged 
classic in American legal and intellectual history.  See, e.g., MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL 
THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 59–75 (1949). 
82. Holmes, supra note 10, at 466.  Mark Tushnet has suggested it would be a 
mistake to equate too closely Holmes’s 1881 view of the role of policy in judicial 
lawmaking with his 1897 view.  See Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver 
Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975, 1048–49 (1977). 
83. Holmes, supra note 10, at 466. 
84. Id. 
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in the course of his employment unless he is negligent.”85  Despite 
this instruction, juries “generally find for the plaintiff if the case is
allowed to go to them.”86 Holmes asked why this discrepancy existed. 
His answer was that the common law was out of touch with popular 
perceptions of sound policy: “[T]he traditional policy of our law is to
confine liability to cases where a prudent man might have foreseen the 
injury, or at least the danger . . . .”87  In contrast, “the inclination of a
very large part of the community is to make certain classes of persons
insure the safety of those with whom they deal.”88 
The explanation for this shift in policy preferences lay in the
successful industrialization of America during the nineteenth century.  In 
Holmes’s view, traditional tort doctrine originated in preindustrial 
America—in “the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs, assaults,
slanders, and the like, where the damages might be taken to lie where
they fell by legal judgment.”89  In contrast, the torts of industrialized 
America “with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the 
incidents of certain well known businesses.  They are injuries to person 
or property by railroads, factories, and the like.”90  With respect to these
torts, the liability “is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price 
paid by the public.  The public really pays the damages.”91  Accordingly,
the “question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question 
how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those 





89. Id. at 467. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id.  In The Common Law, Holmes considered the alternatives of strict liability 
and social insurance.  He wrote, “The state might conceivably make itself a mutual
insurance company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens’ mishaps 
among all its members.  There might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid for those
who suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beasts.”  HOLMES, supra note 75, 
at 65.  Alternatively, “it might throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of fault.”  Id.
Holmes rejected these alternatives as unsound: 
The state does none of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that its
cumbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some 
clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo.  State interference
is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good. 
Id.  In his view, “[u]niversal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply
accomplished by private enterprise.” Id.  He also rejected the proposal to “redistribute 
losses simply on the ground that they resulted from the defendant’s act.”  Id.
[Such an] undertaking . . . would not only be open to [the above] objections, 
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question and that this answer could lead to the rewriting of traditional 
tort law.  Holmes wrote that “even now our theory upon this matter [the
imposition of accident costs on employers] is open to reconsideration, 
although I am not prepared to say how I should decide if a reconsideration 
were proposed.”93
   Holmes’s recognition of the need for courts to reconsider traditional 
tort law and policy is consistent with his Lochner dissent’s demand that
courts not interfere with legislative attempts to cope with modern social
and economic conditions and values.  That dissent reflected Holmes’s 
Darwinian view that legislation reflects the outcome of the struggle for 
survival of social policies—and his view that courts should, as Judge 
Posner puts it, “get out of the way of [that] struggle.”94  If courts were to 
rewrite the law of employee accidents, they would not be getting in the 
way by undoing what legislatures had done.  Rather, they would be meeting
what Holmes called “[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law[—]
that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the
community, whether right or wrong.”95  Moreover, as Holmes pointed out 
in The Path of the Law, courts that were unwilling to consider reform of the
is of a nature to threaten others, unless under the circumstances a prudent man 
would have foreseen the possibility of harm, it is no more justifiable to make
me indemnify my neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the 
same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure him
against lightning. 
Id.  As we have seen, however, popular attitudes changed over the next decades, and 
these considerations of justice were no longer as compelling. 
93. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 466–67.  If Holmes himself had addressed the 
substantive issue of what liability rule courts should adopt, he might have reached the 
conclusion that sound policy dictated that the status quo be retained. See Lamson v. Am. 
Ax & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585, 585–86 (Mass. 1900) (holding that assumption of risk bars
worker’s suit against employer); see also Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 
69–70 (1927) (finding that the driver of a truck struck while crossing a railroad was
barred from recovery as a matter of law when the driver did not get out of his vehicle 
when he could not otherwise be sure a train was not dangerously near); United Zinc & 
Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275–76 (1922) (holding that a child cannot recover
when harmed by a poisonous pool of water when he was not induced to trespass by the 
pool but discovered it after he had come on the land).  Judge Posner has written that
“Holmes decided . . . tort cases . . . in accordance with the individualistic, anti-
collectivist—one might even say anti-socialist—philosophy that came naturally to him.” 
Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1983). 
94. Posner, supra note 3, at 527. 




   
 
   
 
  





















common law also were likely to succumb to the constitutional intervention 
characteristic of the Lochner era.96 
In 1897, Holmes clearly foresaw the coming dominance of Lochner-
style jurisprudence: “[P]eople who no longer hope to control the legislatures 
[now] look to the courts as expounders of the Constitutions . . . .”97 
Moreover, “in some courts new principles have been discovered outside 
the bodies of those instruments, which may be generalized into acceptance 
of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years ago, and 
wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not think about
[correctly].”98 Holmes’s criticism of the judges of this era was that they
“failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of 
social advantage.”99  Recognition of this duty would lead to continual
judicial reform of the common law.  Furthermore, the dangers of Lochner 
arose from the failure to recognize this duty because the “duty is inevitable,
and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such
considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of
judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious.”100  Holmes’s hope was that 
if lawyers would “habitually . . . consider more definitely and explicitly 
the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, 
they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see
that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning
questions.”101 Only a rejection of formalism and an explicit recognition 
of the role of policy in judicial lawmaking would lead both to reform of 
the common law and to restraint in judicial review of legislative attempts
to adapt the legal system to twentieth-century conditions and values.102 
B.  The Path Not Followed 
   The failure of Lochner-era courts to follow Holmes’s suggestions is 
not surprising.  What is surprising and of great significance is that even
progressive or liberal critics of the Lochner Court ignored Holmes’s 
argument for a judicial role in the reform of the common law.  Scholars, 
even those critical of Lochner, ignored or explicitly rejected the reform 
role that Shaw and Holmes urged for courts. 
96. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 467–68. 
97. Id.  Holmes noted that a fear of socialism both infected “the comfortable 
classes of the community” and, he suspected, “influenced judicial action both here and in 
England,” although not necessarily consciously.  Id. at 467. 
98. Id. at 468. 
99. Id. at 467.
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 468. 
 102. Id. at 467–68. 
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This denial of an active reform role for courts would more or less 
freeze the common law as it stood at the turn of the century—permeated
with nineteenth-century values.  The Lochner Court, of course, would 
regard this ossification of the common law as ideal.  Paradoxically, the 
revulsion of the Lochner critics at that Court’s abuse of power in striking 
down legislative reforms explains in large part why these critics would 
argue for a judicial role that would preclude much-needed judicial reform of
the common law.  Lochner cast a pall over the idea of courts as agents of 
reform and spawned a view of the judicial role at odds with the view of
judicial lawmaking articulated by Shaw and Holmes.  In this period, we
see the antecedents of what was to become the legal process scholarship 
of the 1950s and 1960s—a restrictive view of the common law role of 
courts that came to dominate American legal scholarship in the period 
after World War II. 
A prominent example of this departure from the Holmesian reform 
orientation is Roscoe Pound.  Pound was a progressive critic of the Lochner 
Court and an admirer of Holmes.103  In his 1908 article, Common Law and
Legislation, Pound discussed both the constitutional and the common law
roles of courts.104  He first took note of the substantial “output of legislation 
in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with which that
output is regarded by courts and lawyers.”105  Pound wrote that courts
during this era both struck down social legislation as unconstitutional 
and narrowly interpreted legislation that was not invalidated.106  In either
event, the effect was to “impede or thwart social legislation demanded by
. . . industrial conditions.”107  Pound argued for a more liberal judicial
attitude toward social legislation and thus for a repudiation of the Lochner
Court’s posture.108
   Pound sharply departed from Holmes, however, when he addressed the
general role of courts.  In Pound’s scholarship, one does not find Holmes’s 
call for the judiciary to bring the common law in touch with the dominant
values of twentieth-century America.  Instead, Pound argued for a limited
conception of the judicial lawmaking power.  He wrote that “[a]s the
 103. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 104.  Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383– 
407 (1908). 
 105. Id. at 383. 
 106. Id. at 385; see also Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 448 (N.Y. 1911) 
(holding unconstitutional New York’s workers’ compensation legislation). 
 107. Pound, supra note 104, at 385. 
 108. See id.
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development of law goes on, the function of the judge is confined within
ever narrowing limits; the main source of modifications in legal relation
comes to be more and more exclusively the legislature.”109  Pound outlined
both competence and political accountability arguments for limiting the
judicial role, much as legal process scholars would do decades later.  On 
the subject of competence, Pound wrote that “courts are less and less 
competent to formulate rules for new relations which require regulation. 
They have the experience of the past.  But they do not have the facts of
the present.”110  Moreover, courts  
have but one case before them, to be decided upon the principles of the past, the 
equities of the one situation, and the prejudices which the individualism of common
law institutional writers, the dogmas learned in a college course in economics, and
habitual association with the business and professional class, must inevitably
produce.111 
Not surprisingly, Pound would have restricted the lawmaking power of this
incompetent and biased judiciary.  “It is a sound instinct in the 
community,” he wrote, “that objects to the settlement of questions of the 
highest social import in private litigations between John Doe and
Richard Roe.”112 
In addition, the nondemocratic nature of judicial lawmaking reinforced
Pound’s pessimistic view of the courts: “We recognize that legislation is 
the more truly democratic form of law-making.  We see in legislation the 
more direct and accurate expression of the general will.”113  Moreover,
Pound continued, “[w]e are told that law-making of the future will consist 
in putting the sanction of society on what has been worked out in the 
sociological laboratory.  That courts cannot conduct such laboratories is 
self evident.”114  Indeed, “[c]ourts are fond of saying that they apply old 
principles to new situations.  But at times they must apply new principles to
situations both old and new. . . .  The old principles are in common law.”115 
Pound drew a broad institutional lesson from an era of “judicial
obstruction or nullification of the social policies to which more and more 
[of the public] is compelled to be committed.”116  Pound did not stop
with a demand that courts restrain themselves in their exercise of the
 109. Id. at 403 n.2 (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 203 (2d 
ed. 1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Id. at 403. 
 111. Id. at 403–04. 
 112. Id. at 404. 
 113. Id. at 406 (citing BERNARD BOSANQUET, THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE 
STATE 120–23 (1899)). 
 114. Id. (footnote omitted).
 115. Id. at 406–07 (footnote omitted). 
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power of judicial review. Rather, he generalized beyond constitutional 
law.  He saw courts as incompetent and undemocratic, and he sought to
confine their lawmaking role within “ever narrowing limits.”117  Major  
revisions of the law—including the common law—were to be left to the 
legislatures.  Rather than urge, as Holmes had, that the courts themselves
revise the common law to reflect the emerging political philosophy of a
new era, Pound gave up on the courts as a major lawmaking institution.118
   Pound’s position is understandable as a consequence of his revulsion 
at the activities of courts of his era.  In this vein, Louis Jaffe later wrote,
“When I was a student in the Harvard Law School in 1928 and 1931, I
came to believe that the judiciary by its very nature was at the worst
reactionary and at the least undependable.”119  The cause of this belief, 
of course, was Lochner and its progeny.  “This was a time when the courts
were declaring social legislation unconstitutional, were stifling union 
organization by injunction, and more or less generally throwing their weight
behind big business and finance.”120  The extent of distrust of judicial
power is illustrated by the questionable status of even Marbury v.
Madison121 among Harvard law students of that era.  “Led by Frankfurter,”
Jaffe wrote, “we were all passionate believers in the dogma of judicial
restraint.  Some of us indeed were sympathetic to the argument that John
Marshall’s assertion in Marbury v. Madison of the power to declare
legislation unconstitutional was ‘usurpation.’”122 
In this context, Pound’s position that judicial lawmaking should be
confined within ever narrowing limits is understandable.  Nonetheless, 
his thesis is hardly an immutable institutional truth.123 More importantly, 
his position conflicts with the teachings of Shaw and Holmes.  A restrictive 
view of judicial creativity overlooks the reality that judicial alteration of
 117. Id. at 403 n.2 (quoting SIDGWICK, supra note 109, at 203) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 
 118.  See id. at 403; Pound, supra note 28, at 622.  However, at times, Pound envisioned 
what appears to be a more creative role for the judiciary. See, e.g., Pound, Judicial Decision, 
supra note 67, at 641, 802, 940.  Nevertheless, the themes of limited judicial competence 
and accountability and the desire to restrict judicial lawmaking persisted in his writings
throughout his life. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 102–03 (1922). 
 119. LOUIS L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 85 (1969). 
 120. Id.
121.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 122. JAFFE, supra note 119, at 86 (footnote omitted).
 123. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 





   
 




   
 






       
 
 
   
  
 
the common law is always subject to legislative reversal.  In addition, 
this view would leave America with a common law reflective of 
nineteenth-century values unless legislatures were mobilized—an unlikely 
prospect given the general inattention of legislatures to the common law 
in all but crisis situations.124 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CRISIS, THE WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION SOLUTION, AND A   
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION
A.  The Industrial Accident Crisis and the Workers’    
Compensation Solution
Faced with the unprecedented crisis in workplace accidents—with its 
toll of uncompensated widows, orphans, and injured workers—American 
legislatures were mobilized.  In his 1907 speech, President Theodore 
Roosevelt responded to this “bitter injustice” by proposing what we now 
know as workers’ compensation.  Workers, Roosevelt said, “should 
receive . . . a certain definite and limited compensation for all
accidents . . . as an incident of the performance of their duties.”125 
Enactment of such legislation, Roosevelt argued, would not only induce 
greater safety but would be a “step toward the goal of securing, so far as
human wisdom can secure, fair and equitable treatment for every one of 
our people.”126  “Employers would ‘gain a desirable certainty of obligation’ 
and ‘get rid of’ burdensome and costly litigation, while the ‘workman
and the workman’s family would be relieved from a crushing load.’”127 
In short, Roosevelt argued, “from every standpoint, the change would be 
a benefit.”128 
124. One early attempt to achieve legislative change in the significant area of 
automobile accidents occurred in the 1930s.  See generally COLUMBIA UNIV. COUNCIL 
FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOC. SCIS., REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION 
FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) (recognizing the “problem of compensation for 
injuries caused by” motor vehicle accidents and “presenting an unbiased statement of . . . 
findings, and suggestions for the solutions of the problems involved” (footnote omitted)).
The modern movement toward no-fault auto compensation plans gained great impetus
from Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell’s work in the 1960s.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. 
KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 124–89 (1965). 
 125. WITT, supra note 4, at 3 (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, supra note 
56, at 11) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Id. at 4 (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, supra note 56, at 11) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Id. (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, supra note 56, at 11). 
 128. Id. (quoting Proud of His Georgian Ancestry, supra note 56, at 11) (internal 
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   Following Roosevelt’s lead, New York enacted the nation’s first workers’
compensation statute in 1910.129  Between 1910 and 1920, state after state 
enacted workers’ compensation legislation.130  Broadly outlined, 
this legislation ensured that persons injured in the course of employment 
were assured compensation even though their injuries could not be linked to
negligence or fault.131  The trade-off for this assurance of compensation was
that the compensation would be limited.132
   The enactment of this legislation marked a seminal moment not only in 
American accident law, but also in America’s commitment to assure the
economic security of its citizens.  Indeed, decades later “ideas drawn
from accident-law reform powerfully influenced New Deal policymaking,” 
as “social reformers . . . advocate[d] social insurance programs organized 
around workmen’s compensation principles.”133  In fact, “[t]races of the
workmen’s compensation model underlay the views of [Franklin] Roosevelt 
himself.”134  In creating the committee that would “craft what would 
become the Social Security Act of 1935,” for example, Roosevelt “drew 
on the basic lessons of workmen’s compensation.”135 The goal “was to 
safeguard individual wage earners and their families against those
‘misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this man-made world
of ours.’”136  “Securing the wage earner and his family against the ‘hazards
and vicissitudes’ of modern wage earning became one of the central themes
of [Franklin] Roosevelt’s presidency, and a core metaphor in his campaign
was the work accident and the experience of workmen’s compensation.”137 
And, as we will see, a similar impulse lay behind the seminal enterprise 
liability analyses of Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s. 
 129. See N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 192–95 (1917). 
 130.  See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 14, at 70. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 71. 
 133.  WITT, supra note 4, at 199. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
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B.  A “Revolutionary” Solution Collides with Lochner-Style 
Jurisprudence 
But that is looking to the future.  In the short run, the nation’s first 
workers’ compensation legislation ran headlong into the jurisprudence of 
the Lochner era.  Less than a year after New York enacted its seminal
legislation, the New York Court of Appeals, in Ives v. South Buffalo 
Railway Co., held in 1911 that the legislative scheme violated the due
process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.138  The court 
conceded that the legislation was supported by “attractive and desirable” 
“economic, philosophical, and moral theories,” as well as statistical
tables.139 And it purported to find merit in the finding of the commission
that recommended the plan that “our system of dealing with industrial
accidents is economically, morally, and legally unsound.”140  Nevertheless, 
the court wrote that such considerations were “subordinate to the primary 
question whether [the plan] . . . infring[es] upon the letter or spirit of our 
written Constitutions.”141  In the court’s view, this “radical . . . legislation”
was “plainly revolutionary.”142  If, the court wrote, the “economic and 
sociologic arguments . . . advanced in support of this statute can be allowed
to subvert the fundamental idea of property, then there is no private right 
entirely safe.”143 
If the Legislature can say to an employer, “You must compensate your
employ[ee] for an injury not caused by you or by your fault,” why can it not go 
further and say to the man of wealth, “You have more property than you need, 
and your neighbor is so poor that he can barely subsist; in the interest of 
natural justice you must divide with your neighbor, so that he and his
dependents shall not become a charge upon the state”?144 
The Ives court concluded, the “final and simple analysis [is] that [it] is
taking the property of A. and giving it to B., and that cannot be done 
under our Constitutions.”145
   The Ives decision unleashed public wrath and “a storm of disapproval,”
causing, along with the Supreme Court’s Lochner decision, “the greatest
court controversy since Dred Scott.”146  Indeed, Theodore Roosevelt
argued that “Dred Scott was worse in degree, but not in kind” than Ives, 
which, he asserted, was “a most flagrant and wanton abuse of a great 
138.  94 N.E. 431, 439–40 (N.Y. 1911). 
 139.  Id. at 437. 
 140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 436. 
 143. Id. at 440. 
 144. Id.
 145. Id.
 146. WITT, supra note 4, at 152. 
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power.”147 Ives became a centerpiece in Roosevelt’s campaign for the
recall of judicial decisions.148 
The voters of New York essentially did recall Ives, enacting a
constitutional amendment in 1913 authorizing the state legislature to 
enact workers’ compensation legislation, which the legislature promptly
did.149  Meanwhile, Cardozo had been appointed to the Court of Appeals 
in 1913 and sat on that court as it upheld, with Cardozo concurring, the 
new legislation in Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co. in 1915.150  The Jensen
holding overruled Ives by finding that the new legislation did not violate 
the Federal Constitution.151 
V. MACPHERSON V. BUICK AND THE JUDICIAL REFORM OF THE 
COMMON LAW 
The enactment of workers’ compensation legislation was a landmark
event in twentieth-century personal injury law.  For Legal Realists like 
Leon Green, it would be the inspiration for further reforms—legislative 
or judicial—of tort law to reflect twentieth-century values.  A second 
landmark event—and an early instance of judicial reform—came one 
year after Jensen with Justice Cardozo’s 1916 decision in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.152  Prior to MacPherson, a person injured by a negligently
manufactured product had no tort action against the manufacturer if, as 
was most often the case, the product had been purchased from a dealer, 
as opposed to the manufacturer.153  Privity of contract was required for a 
tort action.154  An exception to this privity requirement had been established, 
however, for products that were imminently dangerous to life or health.155 
In MacPherson, the imminently dangerous exception was so expansively 
interpreted that by the end of the opinion it was on its way to becoming
the rule for all products.156  As Judge Posner has observed, MacPherson
was Cardozo’s “most important decision in terms of impact on the law,” 
 147. Id. at 176. 
 148. Id. at 152. 
 149. See id. at 176. 
150.  109 N.E. 600, 604 (N.Y. 1915). 
 151.  Id. 
152.  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 153.  See id. at 1051–53. 
 154. See id. at 1051. 
 155. See id.
 156. See id. at 1055. 
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as other state supreme courts would follow Cardozo’s lead in eliminating 
the privity barrier to negligence actions against manufacturers.157  
VI. CARDOZO’S PRAGMATIC JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Cardozo on Judicial Lawmaking 
MacPherson notwithstanding, a formalist view of the judicial lawmaking 
role dominated the judicial opinions and scholarship of the first half of 
the twentieth century, supplemented with the views of those like Pound, 
who rejected formalism but nevertheless held a cramped view of judicial 
lawmaking.  As courts and scholars moved away from the creativity urged
by Shaw and Holmes, they often simply ignored, and at times explicitly 
rejected, a significant reform role for the courts with regard to common
law subjects.  This may have been the dominant view during the early 
part of the century, but it was not the view of Cardozo who carried on
the Holmesian tradition in his extrajudicial writings, most notably in his 
classic 1921 book, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
B.  The Role of Logic, History, and Custom 
   Cardozo rejected formalism, writing in The Nature of the Judicial 
Process that “[t]he common law does not work from pre-established 
truths of universal and inflexible validity to conclusions derived from
them deductively.”158  Instead, “[i]ts method is inductive, and it draws its
generalizations from particulars.”159  Moreover, “[t]he rules and principles
of case law have never been treated as final truths, but as working
hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, 
the courts of justice.”160  Indeed, “[n]othing is stable.  Nothing absolute.
All is fluid and changeable.  There is an endless ‘becoming.’”161 
“In this perpetual flux,” Cardozo wrote, a judge must first “extract from
the precedents the underlying principle, the ratio decidendi.”162  Then  
the judge must “determine the path or direction along which the principle is
to move and develop.”163  Cardozo listed four methods for determining
that path or direction.  First, “[t]he directive force of a principle may be 
 157. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 109. 
 158. CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 22–23. 
 159. Id. at 23. 
 160.  Id. (quoting MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1908)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
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exerted along the line of logical progression.”164  Cardozo called this
“the method of philosophy.”165  Although some had “spoken as if the
principle of . . . logical development . . . meant little or nothing in our 
law,” Cardozo rejected this view, writing “[l]ogical consistency does not 
cease to be a good because it is not the supreme good.”166  “We must
know where logic and philosophy lead even though we may determine 
to abandon them for other guides.”167
   Cardozo pointed out, moreover, that logical development from precedent 
does not always lead to a single conclusion.  At some point, competing 
lines of precedent come into play and point to different paths.  At that 
point, “we must make a choice between them.”168  In such cases a second 
method, the method of history, may “give direction to development.”169 
The history of a doctrine may also suggest limits to its logical extension.170 
Even where the claims of “the directive force of history . . . are most
assertive,” however, they do not “confine[] the law of the future to 
uninspired repetition of the law of the present and the past.”171  “Very 
often, the effect of history is to make the path of logic clear.”172  In other
words, “history, in illuminating the past, illuminates the present, and in 
illuminating the present, illuminates the future.”173 
 164. Id. at 30. 
 165. Id.  Cardozo placed method of philosophy first, not because it was the most
important but 
because it has . . . a certain presumption in its favor.  Given a mass of particulars, a
congeries of judgments on related topics, the principle that unifies and 
rationalizes them has a tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend 
itself to new cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize.  It
has the primacy that comes from natural and orderly and logical succession. 
Id. at 31. 
 166. Id. at 32. 
 167. Id. at 38. 
 168. Id. at 43. 
169.  Id. at 65.  Cardozo wrote that “[s]ome conceptions of the law owe their existing 
form almost exclusively to history.” Id. at 52.  The law of real property provides an apt
example.  Id. at 54.  “Never by a process of logical deduction from the idea of abstract 
ownership could we distinguish the incidents of an estate in fee simple from those of an
estate for life, or those of an estate for life from those of an estate for years.” Id.
 170.  Id. at 51.  “The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic 
may be counteracted by the tendency to confine itself within the limits of its history.” Id.
 171. Id. at 53. 
 172. Id. at 51. 
 173. Id. at 53. 
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“If history and philosophy do not serve to fix the direction of a 
principle,” Cardozo’s third method might: “[C]ustom may step in.”174 
Although in the past law had been seen as an articulation of customary
practices, Cardozo wrote that the effect of custom “in the development
of common law is less today.”175  Today, “we look to custom, not so
much for the creation of new rules, but for the tests and standards that
are to determine how established rules shall be applied,”176 as a guide, 
for example, in determining whether due care has been exercised.177 
C.  Cardozo’s Legal Pragmatism 
None of this would have been startling or upsetting to lawyers and
judges in Cardozo’s day. However, Cardozo then turned to the fourth 
method.  And here his jurisprudence becomes more interesting—and 
Holmesian.  In a nutshell, Cardozo’s view was that judges are lawmakers
and social policy—the welfare of society—plays a role in their lawmaking. 
At times, Cardozo wrote, “we must bend symmetry, ignore history and 
sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends.”178  Thus, Cardozo
moved from history, philosophy, and custom “to the force which in our
day and generation is becoming the greatest of them all, the power of
social justice which finds its outlet and expression in the method of 
sociology.”179 By this Cardozo simply meant that “[t]he final cause of 
law is the welfare of society.”180  It is this conception of law that should
replace “the demon of formalism [that] tempts the intellect with the lure 
of scientific order.”181  “[I]n every department of the law . . . the social value
of a rule has become a test of growing power and importance.”182 
 174. Id. at 58. 
 175.  Id. at 59.  Blackstone had suggested that the common law, or at least some of 
it, was indistinguishable from, or simply an articulation of, customary practices.  Id. 
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1st ed. 1966)). 
 176. Id. at 60. 
 177. Id. at 63. 
 178. Id. at 65. 
 179. Id. at 65–66. 
 180. Id. at 66.  Cardozo was aware that “[s]ocial welfare is a broad term.”  Id. at
71. “It may mean . . . public policy, the good of the collective body.  In such cases, its 
demands are often those of mere expediency or prudence.” Id. at 72.  On the other hand, 
“[i]t may mean . . . the social gain that is wrought by adherence to the standards of right 
conduct, which find expression in the mores of the community.  In such cases, its
demands are those of religion or of ethics or of the social sense of justice . . . .” Id.  The
term social welfare “if not precise enough for the philosopher, will at least be found
sufficiently definite and inclusive to suit the purposes of the judge.” Id. at 73. 
 181. Id. at 66. 
 182. Id. at 73. 
564
  








   
 
   
  
 
   
 
 





 Id. at 135 (quoting Corbin, supra note 26, at 771) (internal quotation marks 
 
 
 Id. at 102 (citing Pound, supra note 28, at 609).  “By emphasizing standards of 
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Cardozo was quick to assure the reader, however, “that judges are
[not] commissioned to set aside existing rules at pleasure in favor of any
other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient or wise.”183 
Indeed, it is only when judges “are called upon to say how far existing 
rules are to be extended or restricted [that judges] must let the welfare of 
society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”184  Quoting one of
Holmes’s “flashing epigrams,” Cardozo wrote, “I recognize without
hesitation that judges must and do legislate, but they do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”185 
Cardozo concluded, still quoting Holmes, a “common-law judge could 
not say, I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense 
and shall not enforce it in my court.”186 
Whatever might be meant by “interstitial,” Cardozo was clear that the 
“function of our courts [is] . . . to keep the doctrines up to date with the
mores by continual restatement and by giving them a continually new 
content.”187  The judge must innovate, Cardozo informed the reader, “for
with new conditions there must be new rules.”188  In short, “[t]his means . . .
that the juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy 
of pragmatism.”189  Moreover, this method is not new.  “It is the method 
by which the common law has renewed its life at the hands of its great 
masters—the method of Mansfield and Marshall and Kent and Holmes.”190
   To illustrate the workings of the method of sociology, Cardozo focused on
“fields in which the method is in antagonism to other[ methods].”191 
Private law provided examples of this antagonism, and Cardozo wrote 
that private law is a “field where the dominance of the method of
 183. Id. at 66–67. 
 184. Id. at 67. 
 185.  Id. at 69 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 




 188. Id. at 137. 
 189. 
utility, by setting up the adaptation to an end as a test and evidence of verity, pragmatism is
profoundly affecting the development of juristic thought.”  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 127 (1924). 
 190. CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 137–38. 
 191. Id. at 75. 
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sociology may be reckoned as assured.”192  Indeed, “some rules of private
law . . . have been shaped in their creation by public policy and this, not 
merely silently or in conjunction with other forces, but avowedly and 
almost, if not quite, exclusively.”193  “[P]ublic policy, as determined by 
new conditions, is competent to change” such common law rules.194 
As an example of this process, Cardozo examined “modern decisions
[that] liberalized the common law rule condemning contracts in restraint 
of trade.  The courts have here allowed themselves a freedom of action
which in many branches of the law they might be reluctant to avow.”195 
Cardozo approvingly quoted a Massachusetts decision in which the 
judge wrote, “[a]rbitrary rules which were originally well founded have 
thus been made to yield to changed conditions, and underlying principles 
are applied to existing methods of doing business.  The tendencies in 
most of the American courts are in the same direction.”196 
Another example offered by Cardozo was the judge-made law concerning
the activities of labor unions.  Here, Cardozo wrote, “[t]he suspicion and
even hostility of an earlier generation found reflection in judicial decisions
which a changing conception of social values . . . made it necessary to 
recast.”197  Cardozo saw this as a field in which “the law is yet in the
making or better perhaps in the remaking.  We cannot doubt that its new 
form will bear an impress of social needs and values which are emerging 
even now to recognition and to power.”198
   Exceeding such common law decisions in importance, however, were
the constitutional decisions of the Lochner-era.  And here the method of
sociology also loomed large.  During the nineteenth century, Cardozo
wrote, “[l]aissez faire was not only a counsel of caution which statesmen 
would do well to heed.  It was a categorical imperative which statesmen,
as well as judges, must obey.”199  It was “one of [those] eternal legal
conceptions involved in the very idea of justice and containing potentially 
an exact rule for every case to be reached by an absolute process of logical 
deduction.”200 
By the end of the century, however, a new political philosophy was 
emerging in this country, and Cardozo quoted Dicey’s description of 
 192. Id. at 94. 
 193. Id.
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 94–95. 
 196. Id. at 96 (quoting Anchor Elec. Co. v. Hawkes, 50 N.E. 509, 511 (Mass.
1898)). 
 197.  Id. at 96–97. 
 198. Id. at 97. 
 199. Id. at 77. 
 200. Id. at 77–78 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Juristic Science and Law, 31 HARV. L. 
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similar development in England where “‘movement from individualistic 
liberalism to unsystematic collectivism’ had brought changes in the 
social order which carried with them the need of a new formulation of
fundamental rights and duties.”201  In America, however, “[c]ourts still 
spoke in the phrases of a philosophy that had served its day.”202  “Even
as late as 1905, the decision in Lochner v. N.Y. . . . still spoke in terms 
untouched by the light of the new spirit.”203  That new spirit, however, 
was famously articulated by Holmes in his Lochner dissent.  It was
Holmes’s dissent, Cardozo wrote, “which men will turn to in the future 
as the beginning of an era.”204  In Cardozo’s view, Holmes’s Lochner
dissent represented “a new conception of the significance of constitutional 
limitations in the domain of individual liberty,”205 and Cardozo reported—
although with mistaken optimism as it turned out—that it was this
“conception of liberty which is dominant today.”206 
Turning to an example from his own court, Cardozo wrote that
“[c]ourts have often been led into error in passing upon the validity of a
statute, not from misunderstanding of the law, but from misunderstanding of
the facts.”207  In 1907 the New York Court of Appeals had held a statute
forbidding night work by women unconstitutional.208  “In 1915, [however,]
with fuller knowledge of the investigations of social workers, a like 
statute was held to be reasonable and valid.”209  For Cardozo, this episode 
revealed that “today . . . statutes are to be viewed, not . . . as pronouncements
of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community, but in the 
setting . . . of present-day conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists 
and students of the social sciences in our own country and abroad.”210 
 201. See id. at 78.
 202. Id.
 203. Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
 204.  Id. 
 205. Id. at 78. 
 206. Id. at 80. 
 207. Id. at 80–81. 
208.  People v. Williams, 81 N.E. 778, 780 (N.Y. 1907). 
 209.  CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 81 (citing People v. Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 




























D.  Cardozo’s Reticent Jurisprudence: MacPherson and  
Ives/Jensen Revisited 
   Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process is indeed an eloquent
exposition of the pragmatic jurisprudence that Holmes had introduced 
two decades earlier in The Path of the Law.  But it is incomplete as an
account of jurisprudential events that occurred during the intervening 
two decades.  Absent from Cardozo’s analysis is an extended discussion 
both of his own decision in MacPherson v. Buick and of the tumultuous 
events leading to the first workers’ compensation legislation in the nation. 
These developments provide far better illustrations of the jurisprudential 
phenomena Cardozo discussed than the examples Cardozo chose to
analyze.  These developments also provide an important link to the work
of the Legal Realists Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn, to which we will
turn shortly.
Judge Posner writes that Cardozo’s MacPherson opinion was “[c]arefully 
qualified . . . [and] modest . . . in pretending to be restating rather than 
changing the law of New York, [and] reticent . . . about the policy 
considerations relevant to the change it made.”211  “Yet . . . it is the very
caution, modesty, and reticence of the opinion that explain its rapid
adoption by other states.  MacPherson is the quietest of revolutionary
manifestos, the least unsettling to conservative professional sensibilities,”212 
even as it “inaugurated fundamental changes in American tort law.”213 
Cardozo displayed similar reticence when it came to discussing 
MacPherson in his extrajudicial writings.  Today law students are taught 
to see MacPherson as the quintessential example of an exception to a
legal rule “swallowing” the original rule and replacing it.  Cardozo did
discuss the phenomenon of an exception to a legal doctrine growing over 
time to become the new doctrine, but he did not mention MacPherson.  
Instead, cases dealing with the right of a beneficiary to recover on a
contract provided Cardozo with “a striking illustration of the force of
logical consistency, then of its gradual breaking down before the demands 
of practical convenience in isolated or exceptional instances, and finally 
of the generative force of the exceptions as a new stock.”214 MacPherson, 
however, would have provided a far more striking—and well-known— 
example of an exception to a legal rule swallowing the rule.  Indeed, 
 211.  POSNER, supra note 19, at 109; see also  KAUFMAN, supra note 30, at 273 
(“Cardozo gave only glancing intimations that any policy consideration affected his views of
the proper outcome in MacPherson. . . .  Cardozo presented the new rule in the most
modest terms.”). 
 212. POSNER, supra note 19, at 109. 
 213. Id. at 42. 
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MacPherson is the classic case of what Cardozo described as “[r]ules
derived by a process of logical deduction . . . [breaking] down before the
slow and steady and erosive action of utility and justice.”215
   Moreover, Cardozo might have used MacPherson as a prime example
of the method of sociology, which counsels that it is the “function of our
courts . . . to keep the doctrines up to date with the mores by continual 
restatement and by giving them a continually new content.”216  And  
MacPherson could have been an example of a time when “we must bend 
symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of other and
larger ends.”217 It was also a reminder that “in every department of law . . .
the social value of a rule has become a test of growing power and
importance.”218 
So why did Cardozo not write of MacPherson as an example of an
exception to a rule swallowing the rule, of courts keeping legal doctrine 
up to date with the changing mores of society?  For one thing, in that age
of legal formalism, Cardozo might have feared that his book was already 
controversial enough.219  Moreover, to write of MacPherson in that
manner would have left him open to the charge that he had only pretended
to restate the law in MacPherson—in other words, that he had deceived
his judicial colleagues.  Cardozo would have been loath to make an 
admission that would have opened him to the charge of dishonesty.  Beyond
this, it would have made it more difficult to convince his colleagues in
future cases that he was merely “restating” the law, even in cases where
that was, in fact, the case.  Moreover, it might have caused other courts— 
loath to confess to lawmaking—to avoid following MacPherson’s lead.
But beyond all that, there is Cardozo’s apparent modesty, for he did not
discuss MacPherson even in contexts in which such a discussion might
have helped to persuade other courts to follow it. 
 215. Id. at 99–100. 
 216.  Id. at 135 (quoting Corbin, supra note 26, at 771) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
 217. Id. at 65. 
 218. Id. at 73. 
219. When first asked to allow his Yale lectures to be published as a book, Cardozo
balked, saying that he did “not dare to have [them] published” lest he “be impeached.” 
Corbin, supra note 23, at 198.  Although upon publication the book was praised by the 
likes of Learned Hand and Harlan Fiske Stone, Hand wrote that there would be 
“excellent people who cannot help feeling that the voice of [the] book is in a way the
voice of heresy.”  Learned Hand, Book Review, 35 HARV. L. REV. 479, 480 (1922) 
(reviewing CARDOZO, supra note 23). 
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Indeed, Cardozo seems to have gone out of his way not to discuss 
MacPherson by name.  By the date that Cardozo gave his lectures, the 
persuasiveness of Cardozo’s MacPherson decision had become evident. 
Cardozo, in fact, discussed a Second Circuit decision that had relied on
MacPherson in deciding to reverse its own position in a previous decision
in the same case.220  But he did not mention MacPherson by name in the
text.221  Rather than noting the federal court’s decision as evidence of a
tendency of courts to follow MacPherson, Cardozo characterized the
sequence of federal decisions as an “extreme illustration” of the ability of
American courts to “overrule their own prior decisions when manifestly 
erroneous.”222 
If the Second Circuit decision was an extreme example of overruling, 
the New York Court of Appeals’ 1915 Jensen decision upholding the 
reenacted workers’ compensation legislation, and overruling the 1911
Ives decision by holding that the new legislation did not violate the 
Federal Constitution, was a monumental overruling.  It will be recalled
that during the decade preceding The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
New York had been through a legislative and judicial firestorm stirred
up by Ives.223  As he did in the case of MacPherson, Cardozo chose to
steer clear of these momentous events, choosing the previously discussed, 
closely parallel—but far less controversial—women’s night work decisions 
as an example of the Court of Appeals overruling its previous Lochner-
like decisions.224  Cardozo wrote that in initially invalidating the women’s
 220.  See CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 158–59 (discussing Johnson v. Cadillac Motor 
Car Co., 261 F. 878 (2d Cir. 1919)).  In Johnson, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a
defective car and prevailed in the trial court, but the Second Circuit reversed on the 
ground that the plaintiff was not in privity of contract with the manufacturer. 261 F. at 
878–79.  The trial court then dismissed the suit based on that ruling.  Id. at 879.  This 
time the plaintiff appealed.  See id. at 882.  In the meantime, the Court of Appeals had 
decided MacPherson.  Id.  On the Johnson plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit court, 
relying on MacPherson, overruled its prior ruling and reversed the dismissal.  Id. at 882– 
87. 
 221. See CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 159.  However, Cardozo did discuss MacPherson 
in the text of The Growth of the Law.  CARDOZO, supra note 189.  There he observed that 
the law before MacPherson was equivocal.  Id. at 41.  He also wrote that the struggle 
between logic and utility persisted in courts dealing with the privity requirement, noting 
that the law in the United States was “not uniform.”  Id. at 78. 
 222. CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 158–59. 
 223. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
224.  How far clear can be seen in Cardozo’s discussion of Holmes’s essay, The 
Path of the Law, which preceded Roosevelt’s rousing 1907 call to action by a decade.  In 
The Nature of the Judicial Process, Cardozo quoted a large block of material in which 
Holmes argued, “[w]e do not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration
upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.”  Holmes, supra note 10, at 466; see
also  CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 117–18 (quoting Holmes, supra note 10, at 466).
However, Cardozo omitted Holmes’s principal example, the suggestion that courts might
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night work legislation, his court had “been led into error . . . not from
misunderstanding of the law, but from misunderstanding of the facts,” 
namely “present-day conditions, as revealed by the labors of economists 
and students of the social sciences in our own country and abroad.”225 
Such a benign explanation, however, could not be given for Ives.  The 
Ives court had not misunderstood the facts and was well aware of 
present-day conditions.226  Indeed, the court took note of the “attractive
and desirable” “economic, philosophical, and moral theories,” as well as 
statistical tables supporting workers’ compensation.227  Such considerations, 
however, were found to be irrelevant to constitutional analysis.228 In 
contrast, they were of central importance when the court later upheld the 
reenacted legislation in Jensen.229  Indeed, the court wrote that with
changes “in industrial conditions, an opinion has gradually developed,
which almost universally favors a more just and economical system of
providing compensation for accidental injuries to employ[ee]s as a
substitute for wasteful and protracted damage suits, usually unjust in
their results . . . to the employer[,] the employ[ee], [or] both.”230 As 
Thomas Reed Powell would later write, the Jensen court “looked with 
new glasses” on the legislation, embracing “‘economic and sociological
arguments which the Ives opinion’ had . . . ‘dismissed as immaterial’ to
the legal analysis.”231 
rewrite employee accident law, which was situated among the examples Cardozo did 
quote.  See CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 117–18; Holmes, supra note 10, at 466.  In The
Growth of the Law, Cardozo discussed Ives as an example of a “case where a choice of
methods [property as an absolute, “[t]he method of logic . . . at work,” or “logic supplemented
by the social sciences”] was possible.  It is quite aside from my purpose to inquire 
whether the choice as made was right.”  CARDOZO, supra note 189, at 71–73. 
 225. CARDOZO, supra note 23, at 80–81. 
226.  Closer to the mark was the observation found in the material that Cardozo 
chose not to include in his long quotation, discussed supra note 224, from Holmes’s The
Path of the Law.  In the omitted material, Holmes wrote that a “fear [of socialism] has 
influenced judicial action.” Holmes, supra note 10, at 467. Holmes thus anticipated
Ives, in which such a fear was evident, as the court wrote that if the legislature could
require an employer, free of fault, to compensate an injured employee, why could it not 
“say to the man of wealth . . . ‘your neighbor is so poor that he can barely subsist; in the
interest of natural justice you must divide with your neighbor.’”  Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. 
Co., 94 N.E. 431, 440 (N.Y. 1911). 
 227. Id. at 437. 
 228. Id.
229.  Jensen v. S. Pac. Co., 109 N.E. 600, 604 (N.Y. 1915). 
 230.  Id. 
 231. WITT, supra note 4, at 177 (quoting T.R. Powell, The Workmen’s Compensation
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VII. LEON GREEN AND KARL LLEWELLYN: LEGAL REALISM, 
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, AND LEGAL PRAGMATISM 
A.  The Transition to Legal Realism/Enterprise Liability 
   Taken together, the legislative enactment of workers’ compensation plans
and the judicial erosion, and then elimination, of the privity requirement 
in products liability suits against manufacturers marked a turning point
in American personal injury law.  The combination of these developments 
could be seen to indicate that nineteenth-century limitations on liability
were out of tune with the conditions and values of twentieth-century
America.  If so, would legislatures respond by enacting compensation plans 
tailored to accident situations beyond the workplace? 
As to the judicial reform of the common law, tort law was littered with
doctrines that denied recovery to persons injured by negligence.  These
doctrines included the traditional rules of landowner liability, the immunity
afforded to governmental and charitable organizations, the doctrine of
intrafamily immunity, and the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk.  Might we see judicial reform implemented by the
process Cardozo described as “[r]ules derived by a process of logical
deduction . . . [breaking] down before the slow and steady and erosive 
action of utility and justice?”232  Indeed, might courts even follow the
example of workers’ compensation and adopt new strict liability rules or 
expand old ones? 
   One scholar feared that we might, in fact, see the judicial adoption of 
strict liability rules.  Jeremiah Smith, himself a former judge, was a 
traditional tort theorist and no proponent of strict liability.233  Nevertheless, 
writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1914, Smith acknowledged that 
the strict liability imposed “under the Workmen’s Compensation Acts 
[was] absolutely incongruous with the results reached under the modern 
common law as to various persons whose cases are not affected by these
statutes.”234  To illustrate this incongruity, Smith contrasted the situation 
of an injured employee with that of “an outsider, or a paying customer of 
the business [who] is damaged by pure accident in the conduct of the 
 232. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
233. Wex S. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen’s 
Compensation, 12 LA. L. REV. 231, 234 (1952). 
 234.  Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts (pt. 2), 27 HARV. L. 
REV. 344, 363 (1914).  Smith held conservative political views and deplored the workmen’s
compensation movement.  See Malone, supra note 233, at 234.  He recognized, however, 
that the “felt necessities” of an era are not necessarily those of a particular author.  See 
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business.”235  Although workers’ compensation legislation provided an
assurance of compensation to the employee, the common law generally 
afforded the outsider or paying customer “no remedy at all against the
owner of the business.”236  Yet outsiders who often cannot protect
themselves and who do not benefit from the business arguably have an
argument for compensation “equal in justice to that of the workman.”237 
Moreover, paying customers contribute to the fund out of which workers’
compensation is paid and thus also have a further argument for
compensation.238
   With workers’ compensation firmly established, Smith feared that the
“only present available method to remove the inconsistency is by bringing 
about a change in the existing common law, either by legislation or by
judicial decisions.”239  As to the latter, Smith followed the tradition of
Shaw and Holmes in rejecting arguments that the courts cannot appropriately
bring about such large-scale change.  Specifically, he rejected the argument 
that “judges cannot ‘make’ law; that they merely discover and apply law 
which has always existed.”240  He also rejected the position that “judges
can and do make new law on subjects not covered by previous decision; 
but that judges cannot unmake old law, cannot even change an existing
rule of ‘judge-made’ law.”241  He instead concluded that “judges can and 
do make new law; and also can and do unmake old law; i.e., law previously
laid down by themselves or by their judicial predecessors.”242 
Smith did not suggest that judicial adoption of strict liability rules 
would occur overnight.  “When courts change the substantive law,” he
wrote, “they generally do so very gradually, and often attempt to conceal
(or perhaps unconsciously conceal) the fact of change by using various 
‘fiction phrases.’”243  Smith also suggested that change could occur 
indirectly “[b]y a very liberal construction of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; 
by a broad view as to what constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence;
 235.  Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts (pt. 1), 27 HARV. L. 
REV. 235, 237 (1914). 
 236. Id.
 237. Id. at 252. 
 238. Id. at 253–54. 
 239. Smith, supra note 234, at 363. 
 240.  Id. at 365. 





















   
  
  




 See Francis H. Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than 
 
 See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of 
    
and by inverting the burden of proof (putting on defendant the burden of 
proving that he was not negligent).”244 
Despite the fears of Smith and others, tort law and scholarship during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century continued to be dominated by
legal formalism and traditional tort theory, both of which stood in
opposition to courts creating new avenues to recovery.  Traditional
theorists rejected strict liability as “not tolerable” because it conflicted
with “the fundamental proposition of the common law which links liability
to fault.”245  The leading torts scholar of this period was Francis Bohlen, 
who was the Reporter for the Restatement of Torts.246  Although a supporter 
of workers’ compensation legislation247 and the abrogation of the privity
requirement in the products cases,248 Bohlen equated the common law of
torts with the negligence requirement and the defense of contributory 
negligence.  He also rationalized doctrines that immunized defendants, 
such as landowners, from negligence liability on the ground that persons 
have no affirmative duty to protect others unless there is a corresponding 
benefit.249  For traditional theorists, “tort” law was synonymous with
the negligence requirement and ancillary immunity rules; workers’
compensation was a legislative program of insurance, irrelevant to tort
analysis. 
   Although traditional tort theory continued its dominance, ideas that we
would identify today as the early stirrings of the theory of enterprise 
liability theory emerged sporadically in the 1910s and 1920s in the form
of proposals for legislatively enacted compensation plans.  Some authors 
simply urged the extension of the workers’ compensation principle to 
workers—such as railway employees and harbor workers—who were
 244. Id. at 367. 
 245.  See Ezra Ripley Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801, 814, 
815 (1916).  See generally Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to
Land by Blasting—The Rule of the Future (pt. 1), 33 HARV. L. REV. 542, 550 (1920)
(“The history of law as to the former absolute liability in the absence of fault, and as to
the present general requirement of fault as a requisite to liability, can be stated very
briefly.  Speaking generally, the modern law is a reversal of the ancient law. . . .  At the 
present time, it is the general rule that fault is requisite to liability.”).
 246.  See  WHITE, supra note 58, at 78–79; George L. Priest, The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort 
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 466 (1985). 
 247.  See Francis H. Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation 
Acts (pts. 1–3), 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 401, 517 (1912). 
 248. 
Their Immediate Vendors, 45 LAW Q. REV. 343, 343, 369 (1929). 
 249. 
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not covered by state worker compensation legislation.250  More provocative 
was a 1916 proposal of a compensation plan “based upon . . . the 
workmen’s compensation acts” for passengers injured while traveling 
by “railroad and street railway,” the largest “class of cases in most city
courts” at that time.251  The proposal’s author, Arthur A. Ballantine, urged
“liability irrespective of negligence” coupled with “limited liability”
because, in his view, “the cost of the transportation service should include
the expense of insuring the passenger.”252  However, the “rapidly expanding 
volume of motor vehicle accident litigation” soon eclipsed the importance 
of railway accidents, and in 1919, an author argued that the analogy to 
employee accidents and workers’ compensation “suggested . . . the 
application of similar principles to the troublesome problem of motor 
vehicle accident losses.”253  The idea of an automobile compensation 
plan was picked up and pursued in a flurry of articles in the mid-1920s.254 
These compensation plan proposals were early manifestations of the 
emerging enterprise liability theory. 
The focus of writers such as Ballantine on legislative reform of tort
law is easily understood.  Most obviously, the legislative successes of
the workers’ compensation movement inspired reformers to look 
optimistically to the legislatures for further innovation.  More fundamentally, 
these reformers could well have concluded that they had little choice— 
that legislation was the only practical route to achieving the goals of
enterprise liability.  Courts in the hold of legal formalism and traditional
tort theory—and whose ideological outlook had been demonstrated in
 250.  See, e.g., John B. Andrews, Complete the Circle of Compensation, 15 AM. 
LAB. LEGIS. REV. 285, 285–87 (1925) (proposing a federal compensation plan for railway
employees and harbor workers). 
251.  Arthur A. Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 
HARV. L. REV. 705, 705, 707 (1916). 
 252. Id. at 708. 
253.  Ernest C. Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Advisable?, 
4 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1, 2 (1919); see also Shippen Lewis, Accident Litigation, 72 U. PA. L. 
REV. 400, 410 (1924) (discussing a compensation plan for persons injured by a train,
trolley, or automobile).
 254.  See Wayland H. Elsbree & Harold Cooper Roberts, Compulsory Insurance 
Against Motor Vehicle Accidents, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 690, 690–91 (1928); Harry J. Loman,
Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 130 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163, 163, 
170 (1927); Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 445, 
445–46 (1927); Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Automobile Insurance, 11 A.B.A. J. 731, 
731 (1925); Robert S. Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 
164, 164 (1925); Robert S. Marx, The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit and a Remedy, 













   
 
 










     
  
the Ives decision—were unlikely sources of reform.  It is no wonder then
that these reformers had not asked whether workers’ compensation plans 
might serve as a model for changes in the common law.  Nor did they 
speculate about the implications for tort law of the social philosophy 
these plans represented.  And they did not ask whether MacPherson might
lead to parallel developments in a field such as landowner liability. These
matters, however, would become the focus of two of the seminal scholars of
the next generation, the Legal Realists Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn.
B.  The Legal Realists’ Constitutional Restraint and  
Common Law Creativity 
During the 1920s and 1930s, a cluster of scholars emerged whose views 
on judicial lawmaking carried on the tradition of Shaw, Holmes, and
Cardozo—thus diverging from both Pound and the formalists.  Prominent 
among these scholars, whose jurisprudential views are today identified 
with Legal Realism, were Leon Green and Karl Llewellyn, two giants in 
American law.  In the constitutional realm, Green and Llewellyn joined
mainstream scholars such as Roscoe Pound in opposition to Lochner-style
nullification of social and economic legislation—and in the call for judicial
deference to the legislature.255 
The major focus of Green’s and Llewellyn’s scholarship, however,
was not constitutional law.  Green focused on tort law, and Llewellyn
focused on contract and sales law. It was in these areas that their
jurisprudential views most clearly departed from those of Pound. When
they focused on the common law, and in Llewellyn’s case, replacing the 
obsolete Uniform Sales Act, Green and Llewellyn followed the path 
forged by Shaw and Holmes and embraced by Cardozo. 
In the face of formalists who denied that courts make law and scholars
such as Pound who saw a narrowing judicial lawmaking role, Green and
Llewellyn recognized the reality, inevitability, and desirability of judicial 
lawmaking—and the central role that social policy plays in that process.
The jurisprudential view of Green and Llewellyn was simple and clear:
in the common law realm, courts (1) do make law and (2) such lawmaking
is so obviously desirable, necessary, and in our common law tradition 
that it needs no fancy jurisprudential justification—beyond, that is,
arguments as to the substantive desirability of particular proposals. 
 255. Leon Green, Unpacking the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1937, at 67, 67– 
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C.  Leon Green’s Legal Realism and Enterprise Liability 
In a 1929 article, Green vehemently rejected the staples of traditional 
tort theory, declaring that “[c]urrent legal theory . . . is wholly inadequate.”256 
Scornful of talk about a “tort of negligence,” Green wrote that “[t]his 
can only be intended in a catchword sense.”257  In practice, negligence 
law countenanced “ruthless” defenses258 and no-duty rules noted for their
“harshness.”259  Such doctrines granted classes of defendants a preferential
position against which “[e]ven the strong morality of the negligence theory
has made slow progress.”260
   Indeed, the cornerstone of traditional tort theory, the “idea of ‘fault’ . . .
had become bankrupt.”261 As to the reverence given to “principles” by 
traditional theorists, Green wrote that “‘principles’ are nothing more than
the generalizations (assumptions) drawn from the factors which determined 
the initial judgment.”262  It followed that “these factors having changed, 
the initial judgment should no longer stand.  ‘Principles’ should therefore be
expected to vary as do the factors which support them . . . .”263 
In place of traditional analysis, Green offered his own scheme for
determining both common law duties and whether compensation plans
should displace tort law in particular categories of accidents—or situation 
types.  Green urged a focus on five factors: (1) the administrative factor— 
the practical workability of a rule; (2) the moral factor—or considerations of
fault; (3) the economic factor—including the impact on economic activity;
(4) the prophylactic factor—concerned with the prevention of future
harm; and (5) the justice factor—seen as “synonymous [with] the capacity 
to bear the loss.”264  This last factor, which envisioned an inquiry into loss 
spreading capacity as an aspect of tort theory, was truly revolutionary,
and traditional theorists recognized this at the time.  Francis Bohlen, for
example, wrote that the “so-called ‘Justice’ factor . . . has no place in a
restatement of the existing law of the United States and not that of Utopia. 
 256. Green, supra note 33, at 276. 
 257.  Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 258.  Id. at 264–66. 
 259. Id. at 274. 
 260. Id. at 271. 
 261. Id. at 270. 
 262. Id. at 280. 
 263. Id.
 264. Id. at 255–57; Calvert Magruder, Book Review, 45 HARV. L. REV. 412, 415 











   
 
 


















This factor has never consciously or . . . unconsciously influenced the 
decision of any court . . . .”265
   Unlike traditional tort theorists who viewed workers’ compensation 
plans as irrelevant to “tort,”266 the law of employee accidents was the
cornerstone of Green’s analysis, providing “a pattern by which to indicate 
other developments either mature or now underway.”267  The enactment 
of workers’ compensation plans signaled that “a new order of things was 
at hand” and marked a recognition that “risks of physical hurts could be 
distributed as well as could wages and other costs.”268  In Green’s hands,
this recognition became the policy of “plac[ing] the loss where it will be 
felt the least and can best be borne.”269  He argued that accidental injury 
was not a product of moral shortcoming but the “inevitable” byproduct 
of industrial society. 270  Moreover, the “costs of affording . . . protection
can be cared for as part of the costs of the enterprise, and more than all
. . . the risk when it results in hurt . . . can best be borne and absorbed” by
the enterprise.271  This insistence that the capacity to bear and distribute
a loss was a legitimate consideration in tort law injected a vital new 
element into tort analysis, legitimizing the loss spreading policy that 
would become central to what became known as the theory of enterprise 
liability.
Bearing in mind that the same policy, or duty, factors are relevant to 
both the legislative and the common law agenda, it is instructive to see 
the far-reaching implications of these factors by briefly examining Green’s
legislative strategy.  For Green, the workers’ compensation “pattern”272 
suggested that “the question now has come to be, not whether the
negligence process should be recognized as controlling [in specific 
classes of cases], but whether [classes of cases] should not be controlled . . .
by even a more rational process for imposing responsibility.”273 This
more rational process would be legislatively enacted compensation plans
based on the workers’ compensation model, and Green proposed 
compensation plans for “general traffic cases,”274 for railway crossing 
accidents,275 and for children injured while trespassing on the premises
265.  Francis H. Bohlen, Book Review, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 794 (1932) (reviewing 
GREEN, supra note 264). 
 266. E.g., Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 86 (1942). 
 267.  Green, supra note 33, at 270. 
 268.  Id. 
 269. Id. at 256. 
 270. Id. at 278. 
 271. Id. at 273. 
 272. Id. at 270. 
 273. Id. at 271. 
 274. Id. at 277–78. 
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of industrial landowners.276  Green intended these proposals to be 
suggestive, not exhaustive.  He wrote that the “possibilities are many” 
and that he had merely chosen “familiar subject matters” to illustrate the 
“pattern . . . [of] developments either mature or now under way.”277 
Unlike Pound, who had called for narrowing the lawmaking role of
courts, Green envisioned courts reforming tort law to achieve the goals 
of enterprise liability.  Examining cases allowing recovery for trespassers
injured on a defendant’s property, Green noted that under basic tort 
doctrine, a landowner “owe[d] a trespasser no duty other than not to 
intentionally harm him.”278 Breaking from traditional analysis, however, 
Green rejected the “assumption (stated in the decisions as a principle) . . .
that all landowners are to be subjected to the same responsibility.”279  In
his view, special problems arose out of a particular situation type—cases
involving “industrial land owners.”280  In cases involving trespassers injured 
on these industrial premises, courts had been able to impose liability for 
negligence through a process of “‘peaceful penetration’ . . . [although]
negligence [could not] yet wear its own garb.”281  In his finding that
courts singled out industrial premises cases for special treatment, Green’s
analysis confirms Brian Leiter’s claim that judicial “decisions fall into
patterns correlated with the underlying factual scenarios of the disputes,” 
as opposed to formal “legal rules.”282
   Moreover, within the industrial landowner cases, Green believed that
particular situation types could be singled out.  He found that courts had
allowed a negligence cause of action for young children injured by
dangerous and attractive machinery on industrial property, which evolved
into the child trespasser rule.283  Also, in cases of adults trespassing on 
industrial property, courts had required railways to keep a lookout for 
such persons and had required other industrial landowners to warn or 
otherwise protect them from hidden dangers and to refrain from negligent
action while such persons were present.284  Judges in these cases were 
able to provide “‘bootleg’ protection” by “bend[ing] both principles . . . 
 276. Id. at 272–73. 
 277.  Id. at 270. 
 278.  Id. at 271. 
 279.  Id. at 274. 
 280.  Id. at 272. 
 281.  Id. at 271. 
 282.  Leiter, supra note 31, at 1148. 
 283.  Green, supra note 33, at 272–73. 
 284.  Id. at 274. 
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and judgment . . . long before [they overcame] their own habits of talking
about such matters in the refined categories of ‘fault.’”285
   In Green’s view, courts in these cases were responding to his policy, or
duty, factors.  He wrote that the ability of industrial enterprises, such as 
railroads and factories, “to reduce the risks of hurt even as to those who 
insist upon subjecting themselves to such risks, is sufficient to warrant
judgment for plaintiffs in many of these cases.”286  Moreover, “the costs of 
affording such protection can be cared for as part of the costs of the
enterprise.”287  And “more than all . . . the risk when it results . . . can best
be borne and absorbed by this type of landowner.”288 Summarizing the 
application of his duty factors to child trespasser cases, Green wrote that 
“[e]very consideration of economics, of ethics, of prevention, and of
justice would all place a severe duty upon the landowner in such cases.”289 
Green’s approval of the “good result”290 reached by affording such
“bootleg protection”291 can be seen as implicit normative advice that lagging 
courts should move in that direction.  But he also had bigger fish to fry,
and here Green—and Llewellyn, as we will soon see—contradict Brian
Leiter’s claim that the Legal Realists offered little, if any, normative advice
to courts.292 
Noting that the judgments of courts in these premises cases were “years in
advance of their language,” Green wrote that the “normal negligence 
formula of ‘reasonable care under all the circumstances’ was designed
for just these cases in which judgment must have the widest range and in
which uniformity, except in process, is impossible.”293  Green thus urged
that courts, based on his policy factors, do what no court had done or 
would do for decades: hold that landowners owe a full duty of care to 
adult—and presumably child—trespassers—and presumably licensees— 
on industrial property.  Four decades later, the California Supreme Court 
would write policy factors derived from Green into law in its landmark
Rowland v. Christian decision abolishing the traditional landowner rules.294
   Green’s normative agenda, moreover, extended beyond reforms within 
the negligence system.  Contrary to traditional theorists who viewed the 
 285.  Id. at 274, 275. 
 286. Id. at 274. 




 291. Id. at 274. 
 292.  See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A   COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (Legal Realists offered little, 
if any, normative advice to courts). 
 293.  Id. at 275. 
294.  443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). 
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strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher295 as “misguided,”296 Green 
suggested that courts might adopt strict liability rules, which could simplify 
litigation and assure compensation.  Noting that the “extreme use of power 
in Rylands v. Fletcher was not as misguided as sometimes thought,” 
Green approved of a 1928 California Supreme Court decision, Green v.
General Petroleum Corp.,297 that applied strict liability to a defendant
whose oil well had blown out while being drilled with due care.298 
The far-reaching implications of Green’s analysis can be seen in a two-
part article published in 1929 and 1930 by Lester Feezer and “prepared 
under the direction of Dean Leon Green.”299  Elaborating on Green’s
position that courts and legislatures could legitimately decide to “place 
the loss where it will be felt the least and can best be borne,”300 Feezer 
suggested that courts might apply strict liability rules to vehicle operators by
building on Rylands v. Fletcher.301 
D.  Karl Llewellyn’s Legal Realism and Strict Products Liability
Although Green had recognized that courts might expand the reach of 
Rylands-style strict liability rules, his focus on tort law meant that he 
neglected the warranty doctrines of sales law that permitted courts to
impose strict liability in cases of injury caused by food products.302  It  
was out of these warranty decisions that the modern law of strict products 
liability grew and an aggressive common law strategy developed.  The
seminal scholar was Karl Llewellyn,303 who addressed the issue of products
liability in his 1930 casebook on the law of sales and in a 1936 article.304 
295.  (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). 
 296. Green, supra note 33, at 282. 
297.  270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928). 
 298. Green, supra note 33, at 282. 
 299.  L.W. Feezer, Capacity To Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain 
Types of Tort Cases (pt. 2), 79 U. PA. L. REV. 742, 742 n.1 (1931). 
 300. Green, supra note 33, at 256. 
 301.  L.W. Feezer, Capacity To Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain 
Types of Tort Cases (pt. 1), 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 813 (1930). 
302.  For an early account of the application by courts of strict liability in food 
cases, see Rollin M. Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (pts. 1 & 2), 5 
IOWA L. BULL. 6, 86 (1919–1920). 
303.  For an excellent discussion of Llewellyn’s sales scholarship, see Zipporah 
Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
 304. 
see also K.N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. 
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When a “court proclaims a ‘warranty’ and therefore a recovery” in the 
food products cases, Llewellyn wrote, it is not “a case of ‘warranty’ as 
we know it in mercantile sales law [but rather] a technical excuse for 
shifting a risk which seems to call for shifting.”305 Warranty law was
“being stretched . . . to fit a . . . need.”306 As Llewellyn explained, “How
could case-law grow, without technical defects?  You cannot both really
follow, and get results, at once.  Since you have to seem to follow, and
also have to get results, almost every advance is at the price of fudging 
your logic.”307 
The “tendencies toward . . . which [these cases were] driving” was
indicated by what Llewellyn called the “ideal picture”308: “If judges were
legislators, and felt free of precedent; . . . if the courts were given to 
viewing social policy as a whole, rather than the particular case before
them; . . . the goal of the development would . . . have been clear.”309 
The “needed protection,” Llewellyn wrote, “is twofold: to shift the 
immediate incidence of the hazard of life in an industrial society away
from the individual over to a group which can distribute the loss; and to 
place the loss where the most pressure will be exerted to keep down 
future losses.”310  It followed, for Llewellyn, that strict liability should
be imposed on manufacturers who are “equipped to spread, and indeed
to reduce, risks.”311  The suggestion that tort law might serve as an incentive
to reduce accident losses, as well as Green’s prophylactic factor, anticipated
the later economics-oriented scholarship.
This was the “ideal picture,” and Llewellyn wrote that it was “time for
legislation,” presumably to enact this broad rule of strict products 
REV. 665, 665–83 (1925) (providing early presentation of related views).  For a detailed
account of Llewellyn’s contribution to the development of strict products liability, see 
John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise 
Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131 (1988). 
 305. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 343. 
 306. Id.
 307. Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 705 n.14. 
 308. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 342. 
 309. Id. at 341. 
 310.  Id.  In 1920, Rollin M. Perkins, in supporting application of strict liability in 
food cases, had seen such liability as “stimulating such great care that the injury will be 
avoided.” Perkins, (pt. 2), supra note 302, at 110. A 1924 analysis by Edwin W. Patterson 
had suggested that the warranty doctrine applied in food cases should be analyzed in
terms of risk bearing.  Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through 
Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 357–59 (1924).  Patterson was concerned that the
“theory of contracts” posed privity barriers to recovery from manufacturers by injured 
consumers.  Id. at 358.  “[O]nly by some violent pounding and twisting can the [warranty]
concept be made to yield the result called for by considerations of economic and social 
policy.”  Id.  Thus, Patterson asked, “Would it not simplify matters to state the rules as 
one of . . . risk-bearing?” Id.
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liability.312  Although he did not elaborate on this terse suggestion in his
1930 casebook or 1936 article, Llewellyn did take steps to implement it
in his preparation of what would become the Uniform Commercial
Code.313  As to the role of courts, it should be noted that not all courts
were imposing strict liability in food cases.  Thus, Llewellyn can be seen 
as offering implicit normative advice to courts who were “hampered in 
their vision”314: they should join the trend of the warranty line of decisions
that, by “fudging [their] logic,”315 had allowed recovery in food cases 
and that “waxe[d] great by way of glass in beverages or bread, and
poisonous meat.”316  Moreover, Llewellyn did not see this development 
as “confined to [the food cases], its center.  It spreads to cover other hazards
to consumers.”317  And Llewellyn’s “ideal picture” of a broad strict liability
doctrine indicated “a set of tendencies toward . . . which [the cases were] 
driving.”318 
The implications of Llewellyn’s analysis can be seen in a 1938 article
by Lester Feezer, which incorporated in quotation form two pages of
material from Llewellyn’s 1930 casebook.319  Writing that “Professor 
Llewellyn has outlined the situation,”320 Feezer argued that the food cases
 312. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 342. 
313.  In the 1930s, Llewellyn and others began to contemplate the possibility of 
replacing the “rebuilt machine” of the Uniform Sales Act with a new creation, which 
would eventually become the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at xvi; Wiseman, supra
note 303, at 475.  In 1940 and 1941, Llewellyn proposed, as part of his new law of sales, 
a manufacturer’s implied warranty of freedom from dangerous defects.  This warranty  
would impose an “absolute liability . . . on manufacturers for injury ‘in person or property’
incurred by anyone ‘in the ordinary course of use or consumption . . . by reason of the defect
in the goods.’”  Wiseman, supra note 303, at 507 (quoting Revised Uniform Sales Act 1941 
(Report and Second Draft) at § 16-B(r)).  Llewellyn’s proposed sales law was considered 
in the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws beginning in 1940. 
Id. at 482.  Merchants’ representatives voiced such strong opposition at the 1941 conference 
that Llewellyn dropped the warranty provision entirely.  Asked about the deletion at the 
1943 meeting, “Llewellyn replied that ‘every time we tried to draw’ the rule, it [so] ‘scare[d]
everybody that saw it pea green.’”  Id. at 523 n.255 (quoting NCC Proceedings (1943) at 
105). 
 314. LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 342. 
 315.  Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 705 n.14. 
 316.  LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 342. 
 317.  Id. 
 318. Id.
319. Lester W. Feezer, Manufacturer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products:
Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1938) (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 
36, at 340–42). 


















    
 
 










“furnish[ed] a convenient stepping stone for the inclusion of other 
manufactured articles in the same category.”321  Building on this case 
law, Feezer “suggest[ed] the possibility that makers of all sorts of products 
[would] be held responsible . . . without showing negligence.”322  Such  a  
rule would fulfill the policy of placing the burden “where it can be best
distributed.”323 
E.  The Pragmatic Jurisprudence of the Legal Realists 
   With their combination of common law and compensation plan strategies, 
their recognition that courts could “fudge their logic” to reach enterprise
liability goals, and their willingness to look both to tort and sales law to
craft new doctrines, the jurisprudence of the Legal Realists could be
characterized by the word pragmatic.  And Fowler Harper, a contemporary 
of Green and Llewellyn, made precisely this point in a brief 1929 article 
surveying developments in both the constitutional and common law 
realms.324 In that article, Harper coined the term juristic pragmatism and 
thus foreshadowed Judge Posner’s later use of the term legal pragmatism.325
   Harper wrote that “[a]s law for Justice Holmes means prophecies of
what the court will do; so, just law for the pragmatist jurist means 
prophecies of what will produce the most satisfactory and most desired
consequences.”326 And either legislatures or courts could produce this
law.  Thus, Harper wrote, judicial decisions that even in the midst of the
Lochner era “made possible the great flood of social legislation . . . 
completely revolutionizing the legal conception of ‘due process of law,’
proceed from a deep-rooted pragmatist thinking.”327  Similarly, “[s]tatutes
alleviating conditions of employment . . . have higher working values than
decisions which emanated from natural law but left the laborer ‘free to
starve.’”328 
Moreover, “[t]he common law . . . affords constant evidences of the 
juristic pragmatism which alone can solve its philosophic problems.”329 
Leon Green’s tort scholarship provided Harper with his common law 
example.330  In examining conflicting case law on the effect of the violation
 321. Id. at 10–11. 
 322. Id. at 26. 
 323. Id. at 24. 
 324. See Harper, supra note 38, at 273–74. 
 325.  Id. at 275. 
 326. Id. at 273–74. 
 327. Id. at 285. 
 328. Id. (footnoted omitted) (quoting Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13
(1901)). 
 329.  Id. at 286. 
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of a statute, Green had written that “[t]he question was one of sound 
policy, and the Wisconsin court took one view while the Vermont court 
took the other.”331  As to which was right, Green observed that “[i]t is a 
matter of judgment, good taste, an interpretation of the community’s 
desires; in short, law making.”332  Harper wrote that “when jurists talk of 
judicial decision, not in terms of a logically determined system . . . but in 
terms of ‘judgment,’ ‘good taste,’ and ‘interpretation of the community’s
desire,’ they are talking in terms of working hypotheses, offensive to any 
form of natural law.”333  For Harper, this type of analysis was “juristic
pragmatism.”334 
Like Holmes and Cardozo, Green and Llewellyn recognized that courts 
have a legislative as well as an adjudicatory role—and that policy plays 
a role in their lawmaking.  All four of these seminal figures are the
equivalent of Judge Posner’s legal pragmatist who believes that at times 
“judges in our system are legislators as well as adjudicators” and that 
policy judgments are at the core of their lawmaking.335 
VIII. LEGAL PRAGMATISM AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN THE COURTS
   Llewellyn’s, and Feezer’s, proposal for strict products liability was picked
up by Prosser in his 1941 treatise,336 and then, importantly, by Justice
Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court in his 1944 concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.337  Traynor wrote that the
“cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming 
misfortune to the person injured.”338  This misfortune, however, is “a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”339  Traynor 
 331.  Id. at 286 (quoting Leon Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 
N.C. L. REV. 3, 15 (1927)). 
 332. Id. (quoting Green, supra note 331, at 15). 
 333. Id. at 286–87. 
 334. Id. at 287. 
 335.  POSNER, supra note 2, at 118, 238.  Brian Leiter has recognized as much in noting 
that what he calls “nonquietist” Legal Realists could be seen as “‘Proto-Posnerians,’ to 
mark their anticipation of a view familiar in our own day.”  Brian Leiter, American Legal 
Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50,
58 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
 336. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 83, at 689 (1941). 
 337. See 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 











   
 
  
   
  
 
   
 
  
     
  
 
   
 
 










emphasized, moreover, that “public policy demands that responsibility 
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market.  It is evident 
that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot.”340 
Recognizing the still dominant place held by legal formalism in legal
thinking, Traynor, in a series of articles beginning in 1956, joined Holmes,
Cardozo, Green, and Llewellyn in insisting that judicial responsibility
“connotes the recurring formulation of new rules to supplement or displace
the old” and “the recurring choice of one policy over another.”341 For
Traynor, the “real concern is not the remote possibility of too many creative 
opinions but their continuing scarcity.”342  In his view, “[t]he growth of
the law, far from being unduly accelerated by judicial boldness, is unduly 
hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks itself as judicial dignity with 
the tacit approval of an equally lethargic bar.”343 
Beginning in the 1960s, judicial lethargy gave way to the California 
Supreme Court’s embrace of a pragmatic jurisprudence whose outlines 
follow the contours sketched by Holmes, Cardozo, and the Legal Realists.
Under Traynor’s guidance, the California Supreme Court became an
occasional—and in some fields frequent—legislator, with policy at the heart 
of its lawmaking.  By the 1970s, Grant Gilmore wrote, the court had
become “the most innovative court in the country.”344  The consequence of
that innovation, the editors of the Harvard Law Review wrote in 1970, 
was a “dramatic renaissance of the common law.”345  And nowhere was
that renaissance more evident than in tort law. 
Both the strict liability doctrine and its underlying policies were written 
into California law beginning in the 1960s with Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.346  Based on these policies, the California Supreme 
Court, with little hesitation, extended strict liability beyond manufacturers to 
include retailers,347 wholesalers,348 and lessors.349  These rulings, which
courts across the nation quickly followed, represented, according to
 340. Id. at 440–41. 
 341.  R. J. Traynor, The Courts: Interweavers in the Reformation of Law, 32 SASK. 
L. REV. 201, 213 (1967). 
342.  Roger J. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in  LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
TODAY AND TOMORROW 48, 52 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959). 
 343. Id.
 344. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 91 (1974). 
345.  83 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1970). 
 346. See 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963). 
 347. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
348.  See Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557 (Ct. App. 1965). 
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Prosser, “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an
established rule in the entire history of the law of torts.”350
   The Legal Realists’ normative agenda met similar success within 
negligence law.  In 1968, for example, the California Supreme Court, in 
its landmark decision in Rowland v. Christian, wrote policy factors that 
can be traced to Green into California tort law as it discarded the
traditional landowner rules in favor of a general duty of due care.351 
More generally, the court held that the fundamental principle is that 
liability generally should be imposed for an “injury occasioned to
another by want of ordinary care or skill.”352 
Just as in the case of its landmark strict products liability rulings, so 
too the California Supreme Court’s approach to duty has proved influential 
with the nation’s courts, as illustrated by the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts.353  Like California, the Restatement adopts a default rule that
defendants owe a duty of reasonable care to avoid physical injury.354 
Also, like California, the determination that a no-duty rule should be 
 350.  WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 654 (4th ed. 
1971). 
351.  443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).  Rowland adopted and augmented factors first 
articulated by the court in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958).  Biakanja, in
turn, drew on and augmented factors found in Prosser’s hornbook.  See FOWLER V. 
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 1052 (1956); PROSSER,
supra note 350, § 30, at 164–68. Prosser’s factors were an adaptation of the duty factors
Green articulated in his Duty Problem articles.
In deciding whether to retain, discard, or modify traditional no-duty rules in the future,
courts would consider  
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise 
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved. 
Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.  Rowland’s duty factors would provide the framework for
California decisions expanding the concept of duty in later years, but with a more
conservative court in the past quarter century, they also provided the framework for cutting 
back liability.  Compare Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658–59, 661–
63 (Cal. 1985) (emphasizing foreseeability and expanding landowner duty to protect against 
crime by third parties), with Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214–15
(Cal. 1993) (limiting Isaacs). 
 352.  Rowland, 443 P.2d at 563. 
 353.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 (2005). 
 354. Id.
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adopted is a determination of policy or, in the words of the Restatement, 
“[a] principle or policy [that] warrants denying or limiting liability.”355 
Although the Restatement declines to delineate factors to assist in this 
policy determination, a substantial number of states have followed Rowland
in this regard, and half the nation’s courts have followed Rowland in
establishing a unitary standard of care in premises cases, at least with 
respect to invitees and licensees.356 
As a consequence of judicial appointments by Republican governors, 
the court since the 1980s has been a conservative court.  Yet the 
jurisprudence of this court has reflected that of its predecessor.  It also
is an avowedly lawmaking court, with—this time conservative—policies 
at the heart of its lawmaking.  This court has refined or cut back on—but 
in most cases not abandoned—the enterprise liability doctrines put in 
place by its predecessors.357 
 355. Id. 
 356.  See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
671, 676 n.27 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 reporters’ note to cmt. a (Council Draft No. 7, 2007)). 
 357.  See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 214–15 (Cal. 
1993) (limiting duty of business premises owner to protect persons against violent third-
party crime); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 712 (Cal. 1992) (abolishing traditional
consent-based defense of assumption of risk and establishing a new no-duty rule for
coparticipants in recreational sports); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989)
(restricting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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